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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Planning moratoria are freezes on land development imposed for 
land-use planning purposes. Recently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,1 the United States 
Supreme Court considered whether landowners subjected to such 
moratoria would be entitled to compensation under the Takings 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.2 The Court concluded that some-
times they might and sometimes they might not.3 
 The decision’s overarching theme was the need for fairness, which 
the majority enshrined in the new term “Armstrong principles.”4 
While it commended good planning, Tahoe-Sierra did not promise 
that planning moratoria would be exempt from meaningful judicial 
review. To the contrary, it expressed outright “skepticism” of ex-
tended moratoria and provided a roadmap for challenges to planning 
moratoria in future cases. The Court noted: 
 It is worth emphasizing that we do not reject a categorical rule 
in this case because a 32-month moratorium is just not that harsh. 
Instead, we reject a categorical rule because we conclude that the 
Penn Central framework adequately directs the inquiry to the 
proper considerations—only one of which is the length of the de-
lay.5 
                                                                                                                      
 1. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”). 
 3. 535 U.S. at 337.  
 4. Id. at 321 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). For a 
treatment of fairness in Armstrong and other Supreme Court cases, see infra Part III.A.  
 5. Id. at 338 n.34. 
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 This basic theme of Tahoe-Sierra has been obscured, partly be-
cause of dicta supporting regulation6 but primarily because the Su-
preme Court reframed the issues when granting review. The Court 
inverted the first proposed certiorari question, which was most di-
rectly responsive to the decision below, and discarded the others.7 
The petitioner, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. (TSPC), rep-
resented some 400 small landowners.8 TSPC sought review of a deci-
sion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that seemed 
predicated on the theory that planning moratoria never constitute 
regulatory takings.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, 
essentially to review whether planning moratoria always constitute 
regulatory takings.10 
 Not surprisingly, the Court responded in the negative. In rejecting 
petitioners’ per se rule, Justice Stevens wrote for the six to three ma-
jority,11 “[W]e do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use re-
striction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recog-
nize that it should not be given exclusive significance one way or the 
other.”12 
 The principal outcome of Tahoe-Sierra is a vindication of the 
TSPC’s fundamental premise: planning moratoria may constitute 
takings. Additionally, the Court explicitly confirmed that partial 
regulatory takings may require just compensation, which would 
benefit landowners.13 Furthermore, it specified “seven theories” upon 
which landowners might prevail in future cases.14 
 The facts in Tahoe-Sierra are complex, and its procedural history 
is long and convoluted.15 In retrospect, much of its outcome seems 
preordained by the iconic nature of Lake Tahoe, the practical con-
straints on the ability of the landowners to develop their case, and 
                                                                                                                      
 6. See infra Part II.D. 
 7. See infra Part II.B.2 and text accompanying note 75. 
 8. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312. 
 9. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216 
F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). For clarity, references to the vari-
ous Ninth Circuit opinions, all styled Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan-
ning Agency, will be cited hereinafter as TSPC followed by a Roman numeral designating 
its sequence number. District court opinions will be designated simply TSPC. 
 10. See infra Part II.B.2. and text accompanying note 76. 
 11. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337. The opinion was joined by O’Connor, Kennedy, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Id. at 302. The principal dissenting opinion was written 
by Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ. Id. at 343. Justice Thomas filed a 
short dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Id. at 355. 
 12. Id. at 337. 
 13. See infra Part II.D.6. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. For an excellent exposition, see J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long 
Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Its Quiet Ending in the United States Su-
preme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2002).   
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the procedural rulings below. Thus, the TSPC landowners were un-
able to utilize the potential advantages that Tahoe-Sierra now makes 
available to others. Tahoe-Sierra provides support for good planning 
and eschews bright-line rules. It also provides future plaintiffs a 
strong platform upon which landowners can mount regulatory tak-
ings challenges against unreasonable planning moratoria. 
 This Article discusses the Tahoe-Sierra decision16 and analyzes 
the Supreme Court’s reinvigorated fairness principle.17 The heart of 
the Article, however, is a discussion of where Tahoe-Sierra is apt to 
take us. This takes the form of a theoretical and practical treatment 
of how landowners can use the case’s seven theories roadmap to pro-
tect property rights.18 
II.   THE TAHOE-SIERRA CONTROVERSY AND DECISION 
A.   Complex Problems in a Beautiful Land 
1.   The Tahoe Basin—Beauty and Complexity 
 Lake Tahoe is an alpine lake located in the northern Sierra Ne-
vada mountains of Northern California and Nevada.19 It is renowned 
for the striking clarity of its depths and beautiful mountain sur-
roundings. The U.S. district court referred to it as “almost inde-
scribably beautiful.”20 The Nevada and California Supreme Courts 
have been equally effusive.21 Mark Twain referred to the area as “the 
fairest picture the whole earth affords.”22 TSPC joined in this 
praise,23 and the U.S. Supreme Court correctly concluded that “[a]ll 
agree that Lake Tahoe is ‘uniquely beautiful,’”24 and that it is a “‘na-
tional treasure that must be protected and preserved.’”25 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F. 
Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), 
aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  
 20. Id.   
 21. Kelly v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1034 (Nev. 1993) (describing 
the lake as a national treasure); People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 487 P.2d 
1193, 1194 (Cal. 1971) (describing the Tahoe Basin as “an area of unique and unsurpassed 
beauty”). 
 22. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 187 (Hamlin Hill ed., Penguin Books 1981) (1872). 
The district court opinion collects similar Twain quotes. See TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. 
 23. Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1692011, at *3 (“Lake Tahoe is a 
unique treasure.”). 
 24. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307 (quoting TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230).  
 25. Id. (quoting TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230). 
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 There has been equal unanimity that, as the California Supreme 
Court observed in 1971, “the region’s natural wealth contains the vi-
rus of its ultimate impoverishment.”26 TSPC shared that view,27 as 
did the district court.28 “Part of what makes Tahoe so special,” the 
district court explained, “is the amazing clarity of its water, which, as 
a result of its clarity, is an unusually beautiful cobalt blue color.”29 
Most lakes have lacked such clarity because of algae growing in their 
depths. The presence of algae, in turn, requires a nutrient-rich envi-
ronment. Lake Tahoe, however, historically has been lacking in both 
nitrogen and phosphorous, both of which algae require.30 
 By the late 1950s, however, development had led to increased 
runoff and nutrient loading, causing erosion and a proliferation of al-
gae that threatened Lake Tahoe’s clarity. The inadequacy of local ef-
forts to deal with these problems led, in 1968, to the enactment of the 
Tahoe Regional Planning Compact.31 The Compact created the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), which was “to coordinate and 
regulate development in the Basin and to conserve its natural re-
sources.”32 From the outset, landowners have complained that TRPA 
has acted in ways that “destroyed the economic value” of their prop-
erty.33 
 TRPA was directed in 1980 to develop regional standards for air, 
water quality, soil conservation, and vegetation preservation within 
eighteen months. TRPA had a year thereafter to adopt an amended 
regional plan to achieve those standards. In order to prevent incon-
sistent development, the regional planning compact also provided for 
a moratorium on development until adoption of the final plan or, 
“[u]nder a liberal reading of the Compact, . . . until August 26, 
1983.”34 Realizing that it would be unable to meet this deadline, 
TRPA adopted Resolution 83-21, which suspended all project reviews 
and approvals until November 26, 1983. When even this time proved 
insufficient, the TRPA staff bridged the gap between this expiring 
moratorium and its contemplated replacement with nothing more 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Younger, 487 P.2d at 1195. 
 27. See Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 
1692011, at *3. 
 28. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226. “Ironically, the more Lake Tahoe comes to be appreci-
ated for its beauty, the more that beauty is threatened.” Id. at 1230. 
 29. Id. at 1230. 
 30. Id. at 1231. 
 31. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309 (citing 1968 Cal. Stat. 998, p.1900, § 1; NEV. REV. 
STAT. 277.200 (1968) p. 4, and Congressional approval in 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 
360 (1969)).   
 32. Id. (quoting Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 
391, 394 (1979)). 
 33. See Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 394 (holding agency amenable to suit under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 34. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.   
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than administrative fiat. The staff simply notified TRPA’s board 
that, absent instructions to the contrary, they would refuse to proc-
ess development applications as if the expired moratorium remained 
in effect.35 The Supreme Court notes in the facts that “Resolution 83-
21 was in effect from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984. As a re-
sult of these two directives, virtually all development on a substan-
tial portion of the property subject to TRPA’s jurisdiction was prohib-
ited for a period of 32 months.”36 
 On the day that the 1984 replacement plan was to go into effect, 
California challenged it as insufficiently restricting residential con-
struction. An injunction against implementation was issued by the 
U.S. district court, which remained in effect until a new plan was 
adopted in 1987.37 The revised 1987 plan remains in effect today.38 
2.   The Affected Landowners 
 In part because judicial consideration of development moratoria 
after Tahoe-Sierra will largely be concerned with considerations of 
fairness,39 it is useful to consider the identity of the landowners com-
prising the petitioner, TSPC. Unlike the owners of large and expen-
sive homes along the shore, the Tahoe-Sierra landowners were indi-
viduals of modest means who had purchased vacant lots in subdivi-
sions in the hills above the lake prior to 1980, but who did not build 
or obtain vested rights before the effective date of the 1980 compact.40 
 The Petitioners—some 400 owners of individual, lawfully subdi-
vided, single-family residential lots around Lake Tahoe—are 
mostly married couples who bought their lots years ago for indi-
vidual retirement, vacation, or permanent homes for themselves 
and their families. The lots were all located in partially developed 
residential neighborhoods with paved roads, utility service, and 
                                                                                                                      
 35. Id. at 1236. 
 36. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 306. 
 37. Id. at 312. 
 38. While not adjudicating the 1987 plan here, the Court considered it in Suitum v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997). There, another owner of a small 
parcel in a mostly-developed upland zone was denied the right to build, although the land-
owners were given some transferable development rights. The Court ruled that, after a 
decade of litigation, the landowner could assert a takings claim without selling the rights 
first. Id. at 725-26. Rather than continue litigating, the elderly owner settled. 
 39. See infra Part III.F. 
 40. See, e.g., Eric Bailey, The State Lake Stays Blue but Critics of Panel See Red Envi-
ronment, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2002, at B5. The article states that: 
[H]omes in excess of 10,000 square feet have continued to sprout on the shore-
line. . . . “We’re seeing nothing but these monster mega homes,” said [an area 
resident], who worries that the huge structures—and the floating piers, docks 
and storage buildings that go along with them—threaten to trample what re-
mains of the lake’s rocky shoreline. Affordable housing, meanwhile, is virtually 
nonexistent. 
Id. 
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homes built on many of the neighboring lots. All of the landowners 
bought their lots many years before the regulations challenged 
here were even being considered.41 
 From the imposition of the first moratorium in 1981 until the pre-
sent day, many owners of vacant lots have not been permitted to 
build. Some owners have died42 and others have sold to TRPA for low 
prices set by the agency.43 TSPC agreed that construction led to the 
problem and that “[t]he solution, curbing development, was obvi-
ous.”44 The basis for the litigation, according to TSPC, was “not the 
regulatory ends” sought in curtailing growth, “but rather the uncon-
stitutional means employed by TRPA.”45 
B.   The Tahoe-Sierra Litigation 
1.   Convoluted Proceedings 
 The Tahoe-Sierra litigation was protracted over more than two 
decades. There were numerous published and unpublished district 
court decisions in California and Nevada,46 and four published Ninth 
Circuit decisions.47 The Supreme Court focused on one Nevada U.S. 
District Court holding,48 and its reversal by a panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit.49 The Court also noted the Ninth Circuit’s denial of review en 
banc,50 from which Judge Alex Kozinski’s stinging dissent was likely 
an important factor in the decision to grant certiorari. 
 The district court opinion began by considering whether the plan-
ning moratoria would constitute a taking under the traditional 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 
1692011, at *2. 
 42. Gideon Kanner, Temporary Takings, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A21 (noting 
that the case originally was brought by “some 700 individual lot owners (now whittled 
down by death to some 400)”). 
 43. Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1692001, 
at *7 n.8 (asserting that “the majority of the landowners succumbed and were forced to sell 
there [sic] parcels for a fraction of their fair market value to one of these scavenging agen-
cies which paid only the bare residual value of unusable land”). 
 44. Id. at 3. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Breemer, supra note 15, at 7 n.45, 8-9. 
 47. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC I), 911 
F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990), later proceeding, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency (TSPC II), 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. l991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
remanded, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC III), 34 
F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d in part, remanded, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 48. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F. 
Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 
535 U.S. 302 (2002).   
 49. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764. 
 50. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V), 228 
F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (reh’g en banc denied). 
436  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:429 
 
analysis set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City.51 The Penn Central approach requires a court to consider “a 
complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the 
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action.”52 Weighing these factors, the district court con-
cluded that no taking occurred.53 However, it added that, although 
the prohibition on development “was clearly intended to be tempo-
rary, . . . there was no fixed date for when it would terminate.”54 
 Therefore, the moratoria denied the plaintiffs all economically vi-
able use of their properties.55 This constituted a categorical taking 
under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.56 Also requiring 
compensation was First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,57 which held that a regulatory tak-
ing is compensable even if the taking proves to be only temporary be-
cause the regulation is later rescinded or invalidated.58 
 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court had 
incorrectly applied Lucas and misinterpreted First English.59 Judge 
Stephen Reinhardt, writing for the panel, declared that “First Eng-
lish is not even a case about what constitutes a taking.”60 He noted 
that the California appellate court had rejected the landowner’s 
damages claim “on the ground that, regardless of whether a taking 
occurred, the claimants could not recover damages during the period 
running from the time of enactment of the ordinance to the time 
when it was finally declared unconstitutional.”61 The state appellate 
decision was based on the state supreme court’s mandate in Agins v. 
City of Tiburon62 that an injunction was the appropriate remedy in 
an inverse condemnation action of this type. The U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected the California Agins doctrine in First English, holding that 
subsequent invalidation of the regulation, “though converting the 
taking into a ‘temporary’ one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the 
                                                                                                                      
 51. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 52. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 
at 124). 
 53. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1250. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 1245.  
 56. Id. at 1242-45 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)) (establishing the bright-line 
rule that compensation is required whenever a regulation deprives an owner of all eco-
nomically beneficial uses of the land). 
 57. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 58. Id. at 318-19.  
 59. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216 
F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 60. Id. at 777. 
 61. Id. at 777-78 (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 309). 
 62. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
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demands of the Just Compensation Clause.”63 Thus, if the regulation 
constituted a taking, the plaintiffs would be entitled to compensation 
for the period of time that the regulation remained in effect.64 
 Judge Reinhardt emphasized that First English “related only to 
the remedy available once a taking had been proven.”65 Although 
First English held that compensation is required even when a taking 
is temporary, he wrote, “the Court stated explicitly that it was not 
addressing whether the ordinance constituted a taking.”66 Turning to 
this latter question, Reinhardt stated that the moratorium did not 
render the plaintiffs’ property valueless: “Given that the ordinance 
and resolution banned development for only a limited period, these 
regulations preserved the bulk of future developmental use of the 
property. This future use had a substantial present value.”67 Because 
the moratoria did not deprive the property of all economically benefi-
cial use, Lucas was inapplicable. 
 Judge Reinhardt did add one qualifier: “Of course, were a tempo-
rary moratorium designed to be in force so long as to eliminate all 
present value of a property’s future use, we might be compelled to 
conclude that a categorical taking had occurred.”68 However, the pre-
sent value of a parcel of land gradually decreases as the interval 
from the present until beneficial enjoyment is to be derived from it 
increases. For the present value to equal zero, the time until benefi-
cial enjoyment is to start must equal infinity. In other words, the lit-
eral meaning of Reinhardt’s statement is that a temporary morato-
rium is a categorical deprivation only when it lasts forever. 
 The Ninth Circuit denied review en banc.69 However, Judge Alex 
Kozinski’s dissenting opinion, in which four other judges joined, ob-
served that “[t]he panel does not like the Supreme Court’s Takings 
Clause jurisprudence very much, so it reverses First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, and adopts Justice 
Stevens’s First English dissent.”70 In First English, Stevens had ar-
gued that no taking had occurred because the regulation merely 
postponed development of the property for a fraction of its useful life, 
and that the economic impact of postponed development was no 
greater than the economic impact of a regulation permanently re-
                                                                                                                      
 63. First English, 482 U.S. at 319. 
 64. Id. at 321. 
 65. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 778. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 781. 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V), 228 
F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (reh’g en banc denied). 
 70. Id. at 999 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from a denial of a reh’g en banc, joined by 
O’Scannlain, Trott, T.G. Nelson, and Kleinfeld, JJ.) (citations omitted). 
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stricting the use of only part of the property.71 Judge Kozinski noted 
that although the Ninth Circuit did not cite Justice Stevens’s First 
English dissent, “the reasoning—and even the wording—bear an un-
canny resemblance.”72 “By adopting Justice Stevens’s dissent, the 
panel places itself in square conflict with the majority’s opinion in 
First English.”73 
2.   Factors Shaping the Court’s Holding 
 The Supreme Court’s Tahoe-Sierra opinion recounted the view of 
the dissenters from denial of rehearing en banc that the Ninth Cir-
cuit panel’s holding was “not faithful” to the holdings of First English 
and Lucas and added that certiorari was granted because of “the im-
portance of the case.”74 Using his prerogative as senior justice in the 
majority, Stevens assigned the opinion to himself. 
 Tahoe-Sierra’s narrow ruling was affected, first and foremost, by 
the manner in which the Supreme Court shaped its grant of certio-
rari. The Court did not accept the proffered questions pertaining to 
sequential moratoria or to reciprocity in burden sharing. Most impor-
tantly, the Court inverted the question they accepted. 
 As submitted, the certiorari questions read: 
 1. In light of this Court’s clear holding that a temporary morato-
rium on land use can require compensation for a temporary taking 
of property, is it permissible for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
to hold—as a matter of law—that a temporary moratorium can 
never require constitutional compensation? 
 2. Can a land use regulatory agency escape its constitutional 
duty to pay for land taken for public use by the expedient of enact-
ing a series of rolling, back-to-back “temporary” morato-
ria/prohibitions extending over a period of 20 years, and then 
claiming that each of the individual prohibitions on all use must 
be viewed in isolation from the others and, when so viewed, none 
was severe enough by itself to cross the constitutional taking 
threshold? 
 In similar fashion, can such an agency escape the constitutional 
obligation of compensation because a court injunction issued in a 
different case barred issuing permits to other landowners, while 
the agency’s own regulations precluded all use of the Petitioners’ 
land? 
 3. Can a land use regulatory agency purport to “protect the envi-
ronment” at a major regional location (here, Lake Tahoe) by com-
                                                                                                                      
 71. First English, 482 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 72. TSPC V, 228 F.3d at 1000 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). 
 73. Id. at 1002. 
 74. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
320 (2002). 
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pelling a selected group of individual landowners to forego all use 
of their individual home sites, and thereby compel a de facto dona-
tion of their land for public use without compensation?75 
However, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari was “limited to the 
following question”: 
 Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a tem-
porary moratorium on land development does not constitute a tak-
ing of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause 
of the United States Constitution?76 
 Reframing the issue in this fashion permitted the Court to focus 
solely on whether the two moratoria that were considered by the 
Ninth Circuit fell within the Lucas per se test or, alternatively, the 
Penn Central ad hoc test.77 This opened the way for Justice Stevens’s 
extensive focus on the need for comprehensive review and fairness. 
He quoted from Justice O’Connor’s earlier statement that “[t]he 
temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction 
must be resisted. The Takings Clause requires careful examination 
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.”78 
 Somewhat at variance with these laudatory comments about the 
need for comprehensive review in the context of the landowners’ in-
terests was the Court’s discussion of the specifics of the individual 
moratoria: 
This case actually involves two moratoria ordered by respondent 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to maintain the status 
quo while studying the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and 
designing a strategy for environmentally sound growth. The first, 
Ordinance 81-5, was effective from August 24, 1981, until August 
26, 1983, whereas the second more restrictive Resolution 83-21 
was in effect from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984. As a re-
sult of these two directives, virtually all development on a sub-
stantial portion of the property subject to TRPA’s jurisdiction was 
prohibited for a period of 32 months.79 
However, if Resolution 83-21 remained “in effect” until April 25, 
1984, it did so only through extralegal means. By its terms, Resolu-
tion 83-21 expired on November 26, 1983. As the U.S. district court 
explained, “the ban was extended—although not by any affirmative 
                                                                                                                      
 75. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-
1167) (citation to First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987) omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 76. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948 
(2001) (granting certiorari in part for 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 77. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104; see infra Part II.D.6.  
 78. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (second emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 306. 
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action by TRPA, and not, contrary to what the defendants have im-
plied, for any set period of time.”80 
 TRPA staff members advised the Board that the end of the ninety-
day period was approaching, and that absent an order by the Board 
to the contrary, the staff would continue to observe the moratorium.81  
Since the Board never took any action in response to this “advice,” 
the moratorium was, in fact, continued in effect by the staff. 
 Finally, however, on April 26, 1984, a new regional plan was 
adopted. TRPA Ordinance 84-1. The temporary moratorium initi-
ated by Resolution 83-21 thus ended up lasting approximately 
eight months.82 
 On the day that TRPA Ordinance 84-1 was scheduled to take ef-
fect, implementation was enjoined at the behest of the State of Cali-
fornia, which asserted that the new land-use controls were insuffi-
ciently stringent.83 That injunction remained in place until TRPA 
adopted a revised plan in 1987, which prohibited construction on 
sensitive lands in the Tahoe Basin.84 
 The Court’s decision did not address the constitutionality of 
TRPA’s 1987 plan. Petitioners had attempted to amend their com-
plaint to allege that adoption of the 1987 plan also constituted a tak-
ings, but the district court held that the claim was barred by both 
California and Nevada’s statutes of limitations.85 
 In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist attributed the pre-1987 
ban on development to TRPA, since “the District Court enjoined the 
1984 Plan because the Plan did not comply with the environmental 
requirements of respondent’s regulations and of the Compact itself.”86 
The majority concluded that this “novel theory of causation was not 
briefed, nor was it discussed during oral argument.”87 Furthermore, 
the Court asserted that the petitioners did not raise the issue “pre-
sumably because they understood . . . we were only interested in the 
narrow question decided today [, i.e., Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 
83-21].”88 Finally, the Court noted that petitioner’s 1991 amendment 
to their complaint, challenging the 1987 plan as constituting a com-
                                                                                                                      
 80. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F. 
Supp. 2d 1226, 1235 (D. Nev. 1999) (emphasis added), rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 
764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).   
 81. Id. at 1235-36.  
 82. Id. at 1236 (citation ommited). 
 83. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312. 
 84. Id. 
 85. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. 
 86. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 345 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 314 n.8. 
 88. Id.  
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pensable taking, was barred by the California and Nevada statutes of 
limitations.89  
 While it might be reasonable to assume that the complexity of the 
litigation delaying a challenge to the 1987 plan and dereliction of 
TRPA in drafting its 1984 ordinance would constitute additional 
grounds for the Court to adopt a fairness-based “taking as a whole” 
approach, it merely concluded: “As the case comes to us, however, we 
have no occasion to consider the validity of those provisions.”90  Some 
ramifications of the Court’s decision to exclude many important is-
sues from its consideration of the case are treated in connection with 
the Court’s emphasis on fairness.91 
C.   The Supreme Court’s Narrow Holding 
 As Justice Stevens repeatedly emphasized, the Court’s six to three 
holding was “narrow.” It simply refused to adopt a bright-line rule 
that a temporary moratorium on development—even one depriving 
the owner of all economic value of the land while it is in effect—is a 
per se taking requiring payment of just compensation. Nothing in 
this holding was inconsistent with the answer sought by Petitioners’ 
to their first certiorari question, which was that the Court reject the 
notion that temporary moratoria were never compensable. 
 Although the opinion contained broad dicta commending the vir-
tues of planning and the role of fairness in takings adjudication, Jus-
tice Stevens specified that the Court merely was rejecting the appli-
cation of Lucas’s per se rule and reiterating the primacy of the “ad 
hoc” test adopted in Penn Central. “[W]e do not hold that the tempo-
rary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects 
a taking[,]” he wrote, “we simply recognize that it should not be given 
exclusive significance one way or the other.”92 Furthermore, Justice 
Stevens added that “nothing that we say today qualifies [our First 
English] holding.”93 
 Whatever Justice Stevens might have thought privately about the 
matter, these reassurances probably were necessary to prevent Jus-
tices Kennedy and O’Connor, who are the swing votes on takings is-
sues, from writing concurring opinions. 
D.   The Supreme Court’s Broad Dicta 
 While the holding in Tahoe-Sierra was narrow, the majority’s 
dicta were quite extensive. The majority was greeted by supporters of 
                                                                                                                      
 89. Id. at 313 n.7. 
 90. Id. at 312. 
 91. See infra Part III.C. 
 92. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337. 
 93. Id. at 328. 
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land-use regulation as representing “a constitutional acceptance of 
the need for planning in our society.”94 The Court’s “reticence about 
establishing formulaic rules for deciding land use cases” and recogni-
tion of “the pervasive nature of land use policy in modern society” 
were hailed as “significant victories for land use and environmental 
planning supporters, and setbacks for property rights proponents.”95 
“The Court’s opinion is, in short, a sweeping endorsement of the im-
portance of comprehensive land use planning in areas, such as Lake 
Tahoe, dominated by fragile ecosystems.”96 
 To be sure, victories in this passionately contested area of law are 
savored.97 The fact that Tahoe-Sierra was the first clear-cut takings 
victory for planners and environmentalists since Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal,98 fifteen years earlier, undoubtedly added to the excite-
ment. While this euphoria suggests that the Takings Clause has at-
rophied, wiser celebrants recognized that there is no reason to be-
lieve that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have lost their basic com-
mitment to protecting property rights.99 
1.   The Armstrong Principle and the Penn Central Polestar 
 Tahoe-Sierra celebrated and reinforced two basic doctrines of 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. The first is the observation, in 
Armstrong v. United States,100 that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guaran-
tee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without 
just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”101 Tahoe-Sierra en-
shrined this dictum as the “Armstrong principle.”102 The second doc-
trine is the multifactor, ad hoc test of Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. City of New York.103 
                                                                                                                      
 94. Bob Egelko, Property Owners Lose Key Tahoe Case, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 24, 
2002, at A1 (quoting Robert Freilich, who filed an amicus brief for the American Planning 
Association). 
 95. Harvey M. Jacobs, The Politics of Property Rights at the National Level: Signals 
and Trends, 69:2 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 181, 186-87 (2003). 
 96. Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2003). 
 97. See Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and En-
vironmental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 338 (2003) (summarizing 
that “some initial responses to Palazzolo from the property rights movement have been 
near ecstatic”). 
 98. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
 99. See Lazarus, supra note 96, at 15 (observing that O’Connor and Kennedy merely 
“concluded that per se rules sweep too broadly in this particular constitutional context”). 
 100. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 101. Id. at 49. 
 102. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002). The Court had never previously used this 
phrase. 
 103. 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see infra Part III.B. and text accompanying note 149. 
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 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Is-
land104 melded fairness and ad hoc review even more seamlessly, as 
profusely quoted by Justice Stevens in Tahoe-Sierra: 
 In her concurring opinion in Palazzolo, Justice O’Connor reaf-
firmed this approach: “Our polestar instead remains the principles 
set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern 
partial regulatory takings. Under these cases, interference with 
investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors that 
a court must examine.”105 
 More importantly, for reasons set out at some length by Justice 
O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
we are persuaded that the better approach to claims that a regula-
tion has effected a temporary taking “requires careful examination 
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” In that opinion, 
Justice O’Connor specifically considered the role that the “tempo-
ral relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisi-
tion” should play in the analysis of a takings claim.106 
2.   Decoupling Physical and Regulatory Takings 
 It was undisputed that the moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra deprived 
the landowners of all economic beneficial use for the thirty-two 
month period of the Court’s inquiry.107 The Court earlier held the 
permanent physical occupation of private property to be compensable 
in Loretto,108 the permanent deprivation of all economic use to be 
compensable as the equivalent of a physical occupation in Lucas,109 
and a temporal physical deprivation to be compensable in General 
Motors.110 The only box in a type-of-deprivation by duration-of-
deprivation matrix not determined to constitute a per se taking was 
the temporary deprivation of all economic use. The logical completion 
of the matrix, as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, was to treat the 
temporary deprivation of economic use as a compensable “forced 
leasehold.”111 
 The majority in Tahoe-Sierra set the stage for its contrary holding 
by decoupling physical and regulatory takings. Justice Stevens, ex-
trapolating from the “longstanding distinction between acquisitions 
of property for public use . . . and regulations prohibiting private 
uses,” created a superficially similar dichotomy that would preclude 
                                                                                                                      
 104. 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 105. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633). 
 106. Id. at 335 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636, 632). 
 107. Id. at 312 (noting that the ordinances “effectively prohibited all construction”). 
 108. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). 
 109. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). 
 110. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382 (1945). 
 111. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see infra note 184. 
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“treat[ing] cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents 
for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a ‘regulatory tak-
ing,’ and vice versa.”112 
 Furthermore, the Court made it clear that its holding in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council113 was limited to “the extraordinary 
circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of 
land is permitted.”114 The result, as described by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, is that “no categorical per se taking 
rule applies to temporary moratoria on land development.”115 
 The combination of decoupling physical and regulatory takings 
and insistence that the Lucas per se test applies only when literally 
no remaining value is present has the practical effect of removing 
Lucas as a factor in almost any planning moratorium that adversely 
affects a fee interest.116 
3.   Disposing of First English 
 The Court had declared in First English that temporary takings 
which “deny a landowner all use of his property are not different in 
kind from permanent takings.”117 In his dissent in Tahoe-Sierra, Jus-
tice Thomas drew upon this point and Lucas to assert that “a regula-
tion effecting a total deprivation of the use of a so-called ‘temporal 
slice’ of property is compensable under the Takings Clause unless 
background principles of state property law prevent it from being 
deemed a taking.”118 
 The majority opinion essentially denied that the “not different in 
kind” language possessed any significance. Justice Stevens simply 
asserted that First English addressed the “remedial question of how 
compensation is measured once a regulatory taking is established,” 
but did not address “the quite different and logically prior question 
whether the temporary regulation at issue had in fact constituted a 
taking.”119 Judge Kozinski observed in his dissent from denial of en 
banc review that the Ninth Circuit panel had adopted Justice Ste-
                                                                                                                      
 112. Id. at 323 (footnote omitted). 
 113. 505 U.S. 1003. 
 114. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017). The Court added 
that this “emphasis on the word ‘no’ in the text” was “reiterated” by the Lucas footnote “ex-
plaining that the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95% in-
stead of 100%.” Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8). 
 115. Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 116. The Lucas per se test still seems viable with respect to moratoria applied against 
leasehold interests. See infra Part IV.A. 
 117. First English, 482 U.S. at 318. 
 118. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1017). 
 119. Id. at 328. 
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vens’s First English dissent without citing it.120 The observation 
might be equally applicable to the Supreme Court, which “avoided 
similarly overt references to the First English dissent, but the foot-
prints are unmistakable.”121 
4.   Parcel as a Whole: The Temporal Dimension 
 Having uncoupled temporary deprivations of economic use from 
Lucas and First English, Justice Stevens firmly hitched them to Jus-
tice William Brennan’s “parcel as a whole” concept in Penn Central. 
 “Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into dis-
crete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a par-
ticular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether 
a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court 
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the na-
ture and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a 
whole—here, the city tax block designated as the “landmark 
site.”122 
 Justice Stevens embraced Judge Reinhardt’s Ninth Circuit view 
that a “planning regulation that prevents the development of a parcel 
for a temporary period of time is conceptually no different than a 
land-use restriction that permanently denies all use on a discrete 
portion of property, or that permanently restricts a type of use across 
all of the parcel.”123 He added that “a regulation that affects only a 
portion of the parcel—whether limited by time, use, or space—does 
not deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use.”124 
5.   Beneficial Use vs. Value 
 The Tahoe-Sierra majority opinion contains frequent references to 
“value” as well as to “use.”125 One commentator has noted that the 
Court “declined the landowners’ invitation to distinguish use from 
value and, on that ground, to hold that the Lucas per se rule is trig-
gered when all use is barred, even if some positive market value re-
mains.”126 The question of use vs. value is important, in part, because 
                                                                                                                      
 120. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V), 228 
F.3d 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). 
 121. Breemer, supra note 15, at 34. 
 122. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)). 
 123. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency (TSPC IV), 216 F.3d 764, 776 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)). 
 124. Id. at 318-19. 
 125. See id.  
 126. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 13. 127. See, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United 
States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “A speculative market may exist in land that is regu-
lated as well as in land that is not, and the precise content of regulations at any given time 
may not be particularly important to those active in the market.” Id. at 1566. 
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market value may be derived not from permissible uses under a 
regulatory scheme, but perversely, because the regulatory scheme is 
so Draconian as to lead reasonable investors to speculate on its revo-
cation.127 In such a case, the parcel has value not under the use re-
striction but rather in contemplation of the removal of the use re-
striction. 
 In any event, Tahoe-Sierra does not reach this issue. The Court 
wrote: 
[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a 
taking of “the parcel as a whole,” whereas a temporary restriction 
that merely causes a diminution in value is not. Logically, a fee 
simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohi-
bition on economic use, because the property will recover value as 
soon as the prohibition is lifted.128 
 The gravamen of this analysis is that value is not eliminated by 
temporary restrictions because economic use is not eliminated. In 
more standard economics terminology, the value inhering in the par-
cel subject to the moratorium is the present discounted value of the 
anticipated future (post-moratorium) use of the parcel. 
6.   The Concept of Partial Regulatory Takings Reaffirmed 
 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted a dec-
ade ago: “Nothing in the language of the Fifth Amendment compels a 
court to find a taking only when the Government divests the total 
ownership of the property; the Fifth Amendment prohibits the un-
compensated taking of private property without reference to the 
owner’s remaining property interests.”129 The per se takings rule, 
adopted for instances of total deprivation of economic enjoyment in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,130 was, as Tahoe-Sierra ex-
plains, “carved out” as an exception to the Penn Central multifactor 
test.131 
 In spite of Lucas being the exception and Penn Central being the 
general rule, some courts have opined that the absence of a total 
wipeout of owner rights and value means that there has been no vio-
lation of the Takings Clause.132 The possibility that compensation 
                                                                                                                      
 128. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. 
 129. Fla. Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568.  
 130. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 131. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 325. 
 132. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675, 684 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (finding 
plaintiff “did not establish that the ordinance deprived her of any reasonable use for which 
[her] property is adapted and thus destroys its economic value, or all but a bare residue of 
its value.”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); cf. City of Glenn Heights v. Sheffield 
Dev. Co., Inc., 61 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. 2001) (upholding a taking claim based on a thirty-
eight percent diminution in value). 
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would be due for a partial taking under Penn Central simply was dis-
missed.133 
 The Supreme Court intimated that partial takings indeed remain 
compensable in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.134 Tahoe-Sierra subse-
quently made this point explicit after acknowledging that Armstrong 
and Lucas involved total deprivations. “It is nevertheless perfectly 
clear that Justice Black’s oft-quoted comment about the underlying 
purpose of the guarantee that private property shall not be taken for 
a public use without just compensation applies to partial takings as 
well as total takings.”135 In Cienega Gardens v. United States,136 the 
Federal Circuit held that regulations that resulted in the loss of 
ninety-six percent in rate of return for a period of up to eight years 
constituted a compensable taking. “The holding of Tahoe-Sierra, 
thus, does not preclude recovery by plaintiffs who suffered less than 
a total loss but who do argue for recovery under a Penn Central 
analysis.”137 
 Some proponents of increased regulation have found the Court’s 
unequivocal affirmance of the compensability of partial regulatory 
takings to be “ominous.”138 Nevertheless, were compensation limited 
to cases where there is a total deprivation of use, sophisticated regu-
lators could circumvent the Fifth Amendment simply by leaving little 
more than a token amount of beneficial enjoyment. 
III.   SOME COMMENTS ON “FAIRNESS” 
A.   “Fairness” and Property Rights in America 
 The Supreme Court’s association of property rights jurisprudence 
with fairness is not new. Fifteen years before Armstrong v. United 
States,139 the Court declared that just compensation law “undertakes 
to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted by public improve-
                                                                                                                      
 133. See, e.g., Deupree v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 22 P.3d 773 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that an allegation of diminution in value, as opposed to complete deprivation of all 
economically viable use, was insufficient to sustain a takings claim). In Covington v. Jeffer-
son County, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a taking claim where a decision to allow the 
adjacent property to be utilized as a landfill reduced the plaintiff’s property values by 
twenty-five percent. 53 P.3d 828 (Idaho 2002). The court held that where no physical inva-
sion had occurred, Lucas was controlling and requires a complete and permanent depriva-
tion of all economically viable use. Id. at 832. 
 134. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). “Our polestar . . . remains the principles set forth in Penn 
Central itself and our other cases that govern partial regulatory takings.” Id. at 633. 
 135. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332-33 n.27 (citing Lucas and Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960)). 
 136. 331 F.3d 1319, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 137. Id. at 1345. 
 138. See John D. Echeverria, The Once and Future Penn Central Test, LAND USE L. & 
ZONING DIG., June 2002, at 19, 21.  
 139. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
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ments so that they will fall upon the public rather than wholly upon 
those who happen to lie in the path of the project.”140 Indeed, “[t]he 
constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much con-
tent from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from 
technical concepts of property law.”141 
 It is not an exaggeration to say that the American republic was 
founded largely upon an appreciation of the role of property as a cor-
nerstone of individual liberty and of organized society.142 Property 
was the great focus of the Framers.143 In every era since, the protec-
tion of property rights has gone hand-in-hand with the preservation 
of liberty.144 What Tahoe-Sierra refers to as the “Armstrong princi-
ple”145 has its analogues in a number of other cases of recent decades. 
Examples include: “[A] fundamental interdependence exists between 
the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property”;146 
“Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights.”147 
“We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or 
Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor rela-
tion in these comparable circumstances.”148 
B.   Penn Central as Defining Taxonomy 
 Given the centrality of the three-factor Penn Central test, it is 
helpful to begin with the Supreme Court’s dispositive language: 
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some 
                                                                                                                      
 140. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945). 
 141. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (citing United States v. Com-
modities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950)). 
 142. See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 
1795). 
[I]t is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having 
it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men 
have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and corre-
spondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects, 
that induced them to unite in society. . . . The preservation of property then is a 
primary object of the social compact. 
Id; see also Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Prop-
erty Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77 (2002). 
 143. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 92 (1990) (“The great focus of 
the Framers was the security of basic rights, property in particular, not the implementa-
tion of political liberty.”). 
 144. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992). 
 145. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
321 (2002). 
 146. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). 
 147. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993). 
 148. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 
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people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” this Court, quite 
simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for determin-
ing when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather 
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. In-
deed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular re-
striction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to 
pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely “upon 
the particular circumstances [in that] case.” 
 In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the 
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particu-
lar significance. [1] The economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant and, particularly, [2] the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of 
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is [3] the character of the 
governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found when 
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical 
invasion by government, than when interference arises from some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life 
to promote the common good.149 
 The brackets numbering the tests are added since it is not imme-
diately obvious that investment-backed expectations are anything 
more than a subset of economic impact. The character of the govern-
mental action test might attempt to separate out physical invasions 
from all other types of regulations or attempt to distinguish one sub-
set of permissible regulations from others. 
 In any event, the need to more readily characterize the physical 
invasion as a taking lasted only for four years, until the Court ruled 
in Loretto150 that “a permanent physical occupation is a government 
action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to 
other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.”151 The emphasis 
on investment-backed expectations apparently derives from a law re-
view article in which Professor Frank Michelman intended to pre-
clude compensation for speculators in land.152 His view was based on 
“an argument that society may censure morally unacceptable behav-
                                                                                                                      
 149. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added) (alterations in first paragraph in original, alterations in second 
paragraph added). 
 150. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 151. Id. at 432. 
 152. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). For elaboration, 
see Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed Expectations”, 32 URB. LAW. 
437, 437-40 (2000). 
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ior, and an argument that the taking clause need not recognize prop-
erty losses discounted in land markets.”153 
 In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court explains the test by quoting the lan-
guage of Palazzolo: “The Penn Central analysis involves ‘a complex of 
factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, 
the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations, and the character of the government ac-
tion.’”154 In elucidating this “complex of factors,” the California Su-
preme Court adopted a thirteen-factor test for regulatory takings in 
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board.155 Its list comprised 
the three Penn Central factors and an additional ten:  
Subsequent cases, as well as a close reading of Penn Central, indi-
cate other relevant factors: (1) whether the regulation “interfere[s] 
with interests that [are] sufficiently bound up with the reasonable 
expectations of the claimant to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth 
Amendment purposes”; (2) whether the regulation affects the ex-
isting or traditional use of the property and thus interferes with 
the property owner’s “primary expectation”; (3) “the nature of the 
State’s interest in the regulation” . . . ; (4) whether the property 
owner’s holding is limited to the specific interest the regulation ab-
rogates or is broader; (5) whether the government is acquiring “re-
sources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions” such as 
government’s “entrepreneurial operations”; (6) whether the regula-
tion “permit[s the property owner] . . . to profit [and] . . . to obtain 
a ‘reasonable return’ on . . . investment”; (7) whether the regula-
tion provides the property owner benefits or rights that “mitigate 
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed”; (8) whether the 
regulation “prevent[s] the best use of [the] land”; (9) whether the 
regulation “extinguish[es] a fundamental attribute of ownership”; 
and (10) whether the government is demanding the property as a 
condition for the granting of a permit.156 
The California Supreme Court hastened to assure that this list is not 
comprehensive, and the factors should be applied as appropriate 
rather than used as a checklist.157 
 In addition to the Kavanau thirteen-factor test and the Penn Cen-
tral three-factor test, Agins v. City of Tiburon158 contains a two-factor 
                                                                                                                      
 153. Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 13 (1987). 
 154. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
315 n.10 (2002) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)). 
 155. See 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997). 
 156. Id. at 860 (internal citations omitted). 
 157. Id. 
 158. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that the “application of a general zoning law to 
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land”) (citation omit-
ted). 
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test utilized in connection with facial takings claims. It might well be 
that the most comprehensive test is the one-factor test given by Jus-
tice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon—“if regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”159 In short, once the Court 
gave its broad imprimatur to comprehensive land-use regulation in 
Euclid,160 taxonomies such as the three-factor test of Penn Central 
serve largely to rationalize decisions based on judges’ unarticulated 
(and perhaps unarticulable) preferences. 
 In her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,161 Justice 
O’Connor protested that reasonable investment-backed expectations 
should not be seen as “talismanic.”162 Nevertheless, she seemed to 
equate fairness largely with conformance to reasonable landowner 
expectations and with reasonable expectations to preacquisition no-
tice of governmental regulations.163 This approach, which Justice 
Stevens reached out to commend in Tahoe-Sierra,164 may in large 
measure equate fairness with rules that are not ex post facto.165 
 While Justice Kennedy did not accept Justice Scalia’s equivalence 
of complete deprivation of use with physical invasion in Lucas, his 
concurrence in the judgment in that case expressed concern about 
the very problem of lack of objective definitions that Scalia had ad-
dressed: 
There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthe-
sis, of course; for if the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped 
by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental author-
ity, property tends to become what courts say it is. Some circular-
ity must be tolerated in these matters, however, as it is in other 
spheres.166 
                                                                                                                      
 159. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 160. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); cf. RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (advo-
cating generally that constitutional regulation of property is limited to vindication of 
neighbors’ property rights through application of principles such as nuisance, with 
schemes of mutually advantageous regulation constituting takings with compensation in 
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 161. 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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 163. See id. at 634-36. 
 164. 535 U.S. at 327 n.23. 
 165. In her plurality opinion in Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), Justice 
O’Connor declared that, when a legislative act “singles out certain employers to bear a 
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 166. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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 A decade later, Professor Richard Lazarus noted qualms that 
Penn Central is “unduly vague and ultimately incoherent.”167 
Be that as it may, Tahoe-Sierra has now made clear that Penn 
Central best expresses the Court’s own uncertainty about takings 
analysis, and its ultimate conclusion that an analytical framework 
that promotes case-by-case adjudication is more likely to lead to 
sensible results than will any of the competing per se approaches 
advocated by either property rights advocates or environmental-
ists.168 
 Obtaining sensible results might seem more like a legislative 
quest than a judicial one, but the emphasis on fairness in the Tahoe-
Sierra dicta is suggestive that courts take on the role. Sensible re-
sults, however, flow from acts embodying both a specific intent to 
improve the public condition and a general intent to do so within a 
framework of the rule of law. As Justice Holmes reminded us, “a 
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to 
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional 
way of paying for the change.”169 By articulating the costs placed 
upon them by prolonged planning and other development moratoria, 
landowners in many cases may convince the courts that awarding 
just compensation is sensible and fair. 
C.   Physical, Permanent, and Police Power Regulations 
 The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides that Penn 
Central’s multifactor analysis170 is not required in cases where there 
has been a permanent physical deprivation of property,171 a tempo-
rary physical deprivation of property,172 or a permanent regulatory 
deprivation of all economic use.173 A subsequent opinion by Justice 
Stevens, in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,174 posits that 
per se analysis is also “more consistent” when private property is 
regulated to achieve a governmental benefit rather than to limit the 
owner’s use of her property for police power purposes.175 
                                                                                                                      
 167. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 13. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
 170. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
 171. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (evalu-
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 Tahoe-Sierra says that regulations which are regulatory, tempo-
rary, and promulgated to regulate land-use are subject to a Penn 
Central multifactor analysis. As the Court explains: 
Th[e] longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for 
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private 
uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving 
physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a 
claim that there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa. 
For the same reason that we do not ask whether a physical appro-
priation advances a substantial government interest or whether it 
deprives the owner of all economically valuable use, we do not ap-
ply our precedent from the physical takings context to regulatory 
takings claims. Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of 
them impact property values in some tangential way—often in 
completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings 
would transform government regulation into a luxury few govern-
ments could afford. By contrast, physical appropriations are rela-
tively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater af-
front to individual property rights.176 
 The distinctions between physical and regulatory deprivations, 
permanent and temporary deprivations, and deprivations imposed to 
regulate the owner’s use as opposed to imposed to achieve other gov-
ernment purposes all arise in Tahoe-Sierra and are important in 
dealing with growth moratoria claims that will arise in the future. 
1.   Physical vs. Regulatory Deprivation 
 It is perhaps curious that Tahoe-Sierra, a case noted for advocacy 
of balancing and nuance within a Penn Central framework, would 
draw such a strident and bright-line distinction between taking by 
physical occupation and taking by other displacements of landowner 
prerogatives. The majority justifies this result by asserting the plain 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment and by easily recognizable practi-
cal distinctions. Alas, however, the sharp distinctions look less clear 
when viewed critically, and the cost of imagined clarity is the loss of 
property rights—a more serious matter than the misidentification of 
species by amateur ornithologists. 
 The Court says that: 
 In determining whether government action affecting property is 
an unconstitutional deprivation of ownership rights under the Just 
Compensation Clause, a court must interpret the word “taken.” 
When the government condemns or physically appropriates the 
property, the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed. 
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When, however, the owner contends a taking has occurred because 
a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are 
tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a 
taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more complex.177 
 In asserting that “[w]hen the government physically takes posses-
sion . . . it has a categorical duty to compensate,”178 the Court as-
sumes that there are clear boundaries setting off the physical taking 
from the regulatory taking. Alas, there are not. Physical appropria-
tions may be “typically” obvious, but not always. Consider a series of 
examples: the demolition of a private structure and erection of a fort; 
the commandeering of a building for government workers;179 the 
flooding of private land behind a government dam;180 the piloting of 
loud aircraft low and directly over private land;181 the piloting of loud 
aircraft low and just outside the property line; the digging of a gov-
ernment pollution monitoring well; the regular parking of govern-
ment vehicles on private land; the parking of government vehicles 
occasionally or episodically on private land; the accidental demolition 
of a private building; and the government’s construction of a high 
fence completely surrounding a private parcel.182 Is a bright-line self-
evident, separating what is a physical taking from what is not? 
 The Court acknowledged in Tahoe-Sierra that it had required 
compensation for the taking of leasehold interests, “even though that 
use is temporary.”183 It also acknowledged Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
argument in dissent that a temporary prohibition on all use should 
be treated as a per se taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council.184 According to Rehnquist: 
The Lucas rule is derived from the fact that a “total deprivation of 
beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equiva-
lent of a physical appropriation.” The regulation in Lucas was the 
“practical equivalence” of a long-term physical appropriation, i.e., a 
condemnation, so the Fifth Amendment required compensation. 
The “practical equivalence,” from the landowner’s point of view, of 
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 178. Id. at 322. 
 179. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). 
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a “temporary” ban on all economic use is a forced leasehold. For 
example, assume the following situation: Respondent is contem-
plating the creation of a National Park around Lake Tahoe to pre-
serve its scenic beauty. Respondent decides to take a 6-year lease-
hold over petitioners’ property, during which any human activity 
on the land would be prohibited, in order to prevent any further 
destruction to the area while it was deciding whether to request 
that the area be designated a National Park.185 
 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion countered this argument with 
the assertion that condemnation of a leasehold would give the con-
demnor the right to use the property and to exclude others. “A regu-
latory taking, by contrast, does not give the government any right to 
use the property, nor does it dispossess the owner or affect her right 
to exclude others.”186 The problem, of course, is that there is no dif-
ference beyond intent between the leasehold for preservation of sce-
nic beauty and the temporary prohibition on disturbance of scenic 
beauty. Indeed, avoidance of the need to compensate owners through 
the casting of regulations in terms of harm prevention, rather than 
benefit creation, in large part led Justice Scalia to equate deprivation 
of all economic use with physical occupation in Lucas.187 
 In addition to the distinctions noted already, physical invasions 
might be both incidental and non-tortious, such as a seizure of con-
traband or instrumentalities or fruits of crimes. In that case, what-
ever recourse the owner might possess would be under the Fourth 
Amendment.188 Also, there are physical aspects to the regulation of 
intangible property, such as rights in the process of transmitting in-
formation. It is not clear whether rules involving such relationships, 
such as those mandating connections to data networks, are physical 
or regulatory for Takings Clause purposes.189  
 Tahoe-Sierra probably is correct, in some generalized sense, when 
it asserts that the typical physical appropriation “usually repre-
sent[s] a greater affront to individual property rights.”190 But to say 
that physical invasions usually are more severe than regulations or 
for that matter, that physical invasions often could be distinguished 
from tortious incursions, or that permanent restrictions usually are 
more prolonged than temporary ones, hardly gives rise to confidence 
in an arbitrary rule stating that physical and regulatory takings 
claims are to be evaluated by different doctrines. 
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2.   Permanent vs. Temporary Deprivation 
 The durational element of a permanent physical occupation is not 
necessarily to be taken literally. In Hendler v. United States,191 the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that “[a]ll takings are 
‘temporary,’ in the sense that the government can always change its 
mind at a later time.”192 Later, in Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United 
States,193 it explained that: “A ‘permanent’ physical occupation does 
not necessarily mean a taking unlimited in duration. A ‘permanent’ 
taking can have a limited term. In Hendler, this court concluded that 
the distinction between ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ takings refers to 
the nature of the intrusion, not its temporal duration.”194 Even here, 
however, the court runs together duration and intensity when it 
added that “[a] ‘permanent’ physical occupation, as distinguished 
from a mere temporary trespass, involves a substantial physical in-
terference with property rights.”195 
 In Tahoe-Sierra itself, TRPA first deprived the TSPC landowners 
of all economically beneficial use of their property in 1981—over 
twenty-two years ago. Given the posture in which the case reached 
the Supreme Court, the majority would not consider that the prohibi-
tion on development certainly seems permanent. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued in dissent that the Court consider a six-year pe-
riod.196 The majority took into account only a thirty-two month pe-
riod.197  Yet every one of these time periods, from longest to shortest, 
exceeds by a substantial margin the two-year period that constituted 
a permanent deprivation, which gave rise to the per se rule in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.198 
3. Deprivations to Regulate Use Versus Regulations to Achieve 
Other Purposes 
 As was noted earlier, the decoupling of physical and regulatory 
takings doctrine was an important element of Tahoe-Sierra:199 
[The] longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for 
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private 
uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving 
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physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a 
claim that there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa.200 
 There is a significant defect with the logic of this sentence. The 
Court here uses the term “acquisitions . . . for public use” in the sense 
of physical acquisitions.201 However, regulations may be “for public 
use” as well. The lack of a clear demarcation between regulations 
that take private property for public use and those that regulate the 
owner’s own use of the property was the point of Justice Scalia’s dis-
cussion in Lucas regarding the conceptual flaws of a jurisprudence 
based on the difference between a conferral of benefit and a preven-
tion of harm.202 Indeed, the ease by which all but “stupid” legislative 
staff could dress benefit-conferring regulations to look like harm-
preventing regulations203 led Justice Scalia’s quest for discerning the 
more objective “restrictions that background principles of the State’s 
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”204 
 The Supreme Court’s post-Tahoe-Sierra interest on lawyers’ trust 
accounts (IOLTA) decision, Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washing-
ton,205 again brings up the key element of whether the regulation is 
intended to regulate the owner, in his or her use of the property, or 
whether it is intended for another unrelated purpose. Brown consid-
ered the Washington state IOLTA plan, which mandated that law-
yers place in special accounts funds belonging to clients that are ex-
pected to generate so little interest as to make it impractical to 
transmit that interest to the clients.206 Lawyers further are required 
to transfer the accumulated interest in those accounts to legal ser-
vices organizations designated by the court.207 The petitioners 
claimed, under the doctrine that interest belongs to the owner of the 
principal, that the interest constituted their property.208 In Phillips v. 
Washington Legal Foundation,209 a case involving the similar Texas 
IOLTA program, the Court held “that the interest income generated 
by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of the 
owner of the principal.”210 Writing for the Court in Brown, Justice 
Stevens “agree[d] that a per se approach is more consistent with the 
reasoning in our Phillips opinion than Penn Central’s ad hoc analy-
sis.”211 
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 Brown ultimately upheld the IOLTA program on the ground that 
the law clients suffered no pecuniary loss and that therefore there 
was no violation of the Just Compensation Clause.212 Nevertheless, 
Brown apparently stands for the proposition that the commandeer-
ing of an intangible asset to achieve a governmental purpose unre-
lated to that asset constitutes a taking, even when no pecuniary loss 
results to its owner. 
4. Consequentialist Arguments Favoring a Penn Central 
Approach 
 While Justice Stevens’s Tahoe-Sierra opinion discussed theory, it 
also asserted that refraining from imposing a per se test for planning 
moratoria would have salutary consequences.  
Unlike the “extraordinary circumstance” in which the government 
deprives a property owner of all economic use, moratoria . . . are 
used widely among land-use planners to preserve the status quo 
while formulating a more permanent development strategy. In 
fact, the consensus in the planning community appears to be that 
moratoria, or “interim development controls” as they are often 
called, are an essential tool of successful development.213 
Appended to this observation, the Court quoted: 
With the planning so protected, there is no need for hasty adoption 
of permanent controls in order to avoid the establishment of non-
conforming uses, or to respond in an ad hoc fashion to specific 
problems. Instead, the planning and implementation process may 
be permitted to run its full and natural course with widespread 
citizen input and involvement, public debate, and full considera-
tion of all issues and points of view.214 
 The full and natural course of planning undoubtedly has great 
merit, especially in the esteem of professional planners. It also in-
vokes the Progressive Era spirit of reform through the disinterested 
application of professional expertise that was the driving force be-
hind Euclid.215 But the neat notion that planning would establish a 
harmonious community with no further need for change has long ago 
faded. The everything-in-its-place homogeneity of Euclidean use 
zones was famously exposed for its sterility by Jane Jacobs over forty 
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years ago,216 and is now attacked by opponents of low density devel-
opment as wasting natural resources by mandating “sprawl.”217 
Planning and land development have an iterative relationship. Plan-
ning affects development, but development also affects planning. 
Given the dynamic nature of our society, planning cannot be a one-
time cure for disorderly development. 
 In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens feared that a rule making mora-
toria compensable would unduly discourage planning.218 In practice, 
however, that is apt not to be true. As Stevens recognized, most 
neighborhood zoning restrictions, such as mandatory setbacks of 
building from the sidewalk, create a “reciprocity of advantage.”219 
Landowners constrained by these types of regulations receive offset-
ting benefit from the imposition of the same restrictions on all their 
neighbors, which explains consensual acceptance of the far more 
stringent mutual restrictions imposed by homeowners’ associa-
tions.220 The taking serves as its own compensation. 
 The sound principle of reciprocity of advantage can be abused, of 
course. Justice Stevens’s observation that “there is reason to believe 
property values often will continue to increase despite a morato-
rium”221 is a prime example of the post hoc, prompter hoc fallacy. Al-
most certainly, most of the rise in prices of land in areas of rapid 
growth is attributable to that growth itself, rather than faith that 
planners will manage growth better than investors. Stevens cited one 
case “noting that land values could be expected to increase 20% dur-
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generally have different areas set aside for single-family residential uses, multiple-family 
residential uses, commercial uses, and industrial uses”); Patricia E. Salkin, From Euclid to 
Growing Smart: The Transformation of the American Local Land Use Ethic into Local 
Land Use and Environmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 118 (2002) (asserting 
that “smart growth legislation advocates local flexibility and promotes mixed-use develop-
ment, in contrast to Euclidean zoning that promotes a more rigid separation of uses”).  
 218. 535 U.S. at 339 (asserting that adopting a per se rule would impose severe costs 
on planning deliberations and “may force officials to rush through the planning process or 
to abandon the practice altogether”). 
 219. See id. at 324 n.19. 
 220. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994); 
Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and “Reasonableness” in Private Law: The Special 
Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 49-50 (1990) (advocating ju-
dicial deference to private decision making in residential communities). 
 221. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341. 
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ing a 5-year moratorium on development.”222 If planning moratoria 
truly have such wondrous effects, “why not sign up for a 10-year 
moratorium and glean a 40 percent return?”223  Furthermore, most 
proper regulations that have an unreasonable impact on isolated 
landowners are ripe candidates for variances224 or entail losses of 
such modest amounts as to make recourse to litigation exceedingly 
unlikely. 
D.   From Parcel as a Whole to Takings as a Whole 
1.   A Broader View of Parcel as a Whole 
 As discussed earlier,225 Justice Stevens’s Tahoe-Sierra opinion en-
thusiastically reiterated the doctrine developed by Justice Brennan 
in Penn Central that the Court must view regulatory takings claims 
in the context of the aggregate of the landowner’s rights—“the parcel 
as a whole.”226 Yet, quite anomalously, Tahoe-Sierra did not deal with 
the whole of the issues fairly raised by the case. As Richard Lazarus 
noted in celebration of the Tahoe-Sierra decision, “[T]he narrowness 
of the slice of that litigation and the background facts before the 
Court in Tahoe-Sierra may well have played a significant role in se-
curing an outcome favorable to the government.”227 
 Justice Brennan’s invocation of “parcel as a whole” gave no prove-
nance for the term. Although he grounded the term in takings juris-
prudence,228 the Court’s existing doctrine had required condemnation 
for partial takings.229 Rather, the “parcel as a whole” doctrine arose 
because the need for determination of the relevant parcel was im-
plicit and unavoidable given the Court’s takings jurisprudence. In 
Keystone Bituminous Coal,230 Justice Stevens stated for the majority 
that 
[b]ecause our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the 
value that has been taken from the property with the value that 
                                                                                                                      
 222. Id. (describing Growth Props., Inc. v. Klingbeil Holding Co., 419 F. Supp. 212, 218 
(D. Md. 1976)). 
 223. John J. Delaney, Tahoe-Sierra: The Great Terrain Robbery, or Simply a Bridge 
Too Far for Landowners?, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 2002, at 15, 16. 
 224. Variances are authorized departures from zoning requirements “where, owing to 
special conditions, a literal enforcement . . . will result in unnecessary hardship.” A 
STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (U.S. Dep’t Commerce, rev. ed. 1926).  
 225. See supra Part II.D.4. 
 226. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326-27 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31). 
 227. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 4. 
 228. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. 
 229. See, e.g., United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 185-86 (1911) (awarding sever-
ance damages to the untaken remainder of plaintiff’s land in an inverse condemnation ac-
tion).  
 230. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
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remains in the property, one of the critical questions is determin-
ing how to define the unit of property “whose value is to furnish 
the denominator of the fraction.”231  
 The opposite position, presented in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dis-
sent in Keystone, is that a taking occurs whenever “the government 
by regulation extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifi-
able segment of property.”232 The doctrine of “parcel as a whole” re-
sponds to the relevant parcel problem by maximizing the size of the 
relevant parcel.  
 While Justice Stevens maintained that the Court has “consis-
tently rejected” approaches that would sever a parcel,233 Justice 
Thomas asserted in dissent that the “majority’s decision to embrace 
the ‘parcel as a whole’ doctrine as settled is puzzling.”234 He quoted 
from Lucas,235 which had questioned the rule, and from Palazzolo,236 
which only a year prior to Tahoe-Sierra seemed to invite its reconsid-
eration. 
 The parcel as a whole rule finds its justification in preventing self-
serving landowners from engaging in “conceptual severance” by de-
fining the affected property right as exactly coextensive with the 
regulatory deprivation, thus always resulting in a total depriva-
tion.237 However, there are several problems with this approach. One 
is determining when the deprivation of a stick from the property’s 
bundle of sticks is determinative and when it is not.238 Another prob-
lem is that terms such as “parcel as a whole” and “conceptual sever-
ance” imply that there is the full parcel to start with and that ma-
                                                                                                                      
 231. Id. at 497 (quoting Michelman, supra note 152, at 1192). 
 232. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 233. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
331 (2002). 
 234. Id. at 355 n.* (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 235. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 n.7 (1992) (“recogniz-
ing that ‘uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in [the Court’s] “depri-
vation” fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court,’ and that the 
relevant calculus is a ‘difficult question’”) (alteration in original). 
 236. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631) (“noting that the 
Court has ‘at times expressed discomfort with the logic of [the parcel as a whole] rule’”) (al-
teration in original). 
 237. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in 
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1988) (“[E]very regulation of 
any portion of an owner’s ‘bundle of sticks,’ is a taking of the whole of that particular por-
tion considered separately. Price regulations ‘take’ that particular servitude curtailing free 
alienability, building restrictions ‘take’ a particular negative easement curtailing control 
over development, and so on.”) (footnote omitted). 
 238. Compare, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing 
“the right to exclude others” as one of the “most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that 
are commonly characterized as property”), with PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (“[H]ere appellants have failed to demonstrate that the ‘right to exclude 
others’ is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the state-
authorized limitation of it amounted to a ‘taking.’”). 
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nipulation can redound only to the landowner’s favor. But clearly 
some definitions of property are too broad,239 reflecting manipulation 
in the government’s favor. I have termed such manipulation for the 
purpose of enlarging the relevant parcel “conceptual agglomera-
tion.”240 
 Although neither the landowner nor the state can be trusted to 
provide a definition free from self-interest, an objective test grounded 
in economic viability can lead to effective scrutiny of the landowner’s 
asserted interest.241 Alternatively, the landowner could satisfy an ob-
jectivity requirement by showing that the asserted property interest 
taken constitutes a “commercial unit” that is traded in the vicinity.242 
 By insisting on “parcel as a whole,” the Court is adhering to a doc-
trine bereft of the flexibility that market or similar forces might pro-
vide. This does not mean that cases under “parcel as a whole” deter-
mine that the relevant parcel always is the extent of land received 
under the deed that includes the area where the regulation purport-
edly works a taking. To the contrary, the area might be smaller, es-
pecially where the landowner can demonstrate that part of the land 
was sold off long before the regulation at issue was promulgated.243 It 
might also be larger when other lands in the vicinity belonging to the 
owner have related uses.244 As Judge Jay Plager of the U.S. Court of 
                                                                                                                      
 239. A classic illustration is the finding by the New York Court of Appeals that the 
relevant parcel encompassing Grand Central Terminal should include “plaintiffs’ heavy 
real estate holdings in the Grand Central area, including hotels and office buildings.” Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (N.Y. 1977). The U.S. Su-
preme Court subsequently deemed the relevant parcel to be the city tax block on which the 
terminal was located. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 
(1978). Later, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court 
deemed what it termed the New York Court of Appeals’ approach of including the “total 
value of the taking claimant’s other holdings in the vicinity” to be an “extreme—and we 
think, unsupportable—view of the relevant calculus.” Id. at 1016 n.7. 
 240. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 11-7(b)(2), at 789 (2d ed. 2001); see also 
John E. Fee, Of Parcels and Property, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 101, 104-06 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002). 
 241. See John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking 
Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1994) (proposing that “a taking has occurred when 
any horizontally definable parcel, containing at least one economically viable use inde-
pendent of the immediately surrounding land segments, loses all economic use due to gov-
ernment regulation”). 
 242. See EAGLE, supra note 240, § 11-7(e)(5), at 813-14. (analogizing commercial unit of 
real property to the commercial unit of goods under U.C.C. § 2-105(6) (2002)). 
 243. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2000).  
 244. See, e.g., Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
“Where the developer treats legally separate parcels as a single economic unit, together 
they may constitute the relevant parcel.” Id. at 1365. 
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit put it, “Our precedent displays a 
flexible approach, designed to account for factual nuances.”245 
 In spite of the difficulties in determining what is the relevant par-
cel under the “parcel as a whole” approach, Tahoe-Sierra seems to 
commit the Court to that framework. The tradeoff, presumably, is 
that the facially rigid, but in fact more subjective, test allows greater 
room for fairness considerations.  
2.   Fairness Requires Consideration of the Taking as a Whole 
 If fairness requires “that ‘the aggregate must be viewed in its en-
tirety’”246 when examining the denominator of the takings fraction,247 
it should require a similar aggregation of restrictions constituting 
the numerator. Just as parcel as a whole focuses on the aggregate of 
the landowners benefit from ownership, taking as a whole similarly 
would focus on the aggregate of the landowner’s deprivation from 
regulation of the parcel.248 
 The stark fact is that the TSPC landowners likely lost their case 
before it was briefed and argued. 
 The government won Tahoe-Sierra because of the narrowness of 
the legal issue considered by the Court: whether TRPA’s 32-month 
moratorium on development amounted to a per se Lucas taking in 
a facial challenge. Entirely removed from the judicial equation 
were factors that could have depicted the petitioner landowners’ 
claims in a more sympathetic and legally defensible light. In their 
stead was a legal issue that effectively compelled the petitioners to 
propound a legal theory that had virtually no chance of prevailing 
before the Court, which is why the petitioners’ briefs on the merits 
repeatedly sought to rewrite the question presented before the 
Court.249 
 As noted earlier, the Court was adamant in considering the land-
owners’ deprivation of all economically viable use of their land only 
in the context of the land’s use for the entire future after the morato-
ria terminated.250 On the other hand, the Court simply has not taken 
                                                                                                                      
 245. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 246. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
327 (2002) (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (holding that prohibition on 
commercial transactions in eagle feathers did not bar other uses or impose physical inva-
sion or restraint and was not a taking)). 
 247. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
 248. The numerator of the takings fraction is the property owner’s loss rather than the 
regulator’s gain, since as Justice Stevens recently reiterated, that is the Constitutional 
standard. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1419 (2003). “‘[T]he question is 
what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.’”  Id. (quoting Boston Chamber of 
Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)). 
 249. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 17. 
 250. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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into account that many of the Tahoe-Sierra landowners were first 
precluded from all economically beneficial use of their land in 1981 
and that they have remained unable to build the homes they had 
planned or to make other use of their property for twenty-two unin-
terrupted years.251 Likewise, it was clear at the outset that prevent-
ing the eutrophication of Lake Tahoe would require severe restric-
tions in “sensitive environmental zones” along streams for an indefi-
nite period.252 
 Justice Stevens acknowledged for the majority that “[t]he ‘rolling 
moratoria’ theory [i.e., the continuity of deprivation] was presented 
in the petition for certiorari, but our order granting review did not 
encompass that issue.”253 He also explained that “the case was tried in 
the district court and reviewed in the Court of Appeals on the theory 
that each of the two moratoria was a separate taking, one for a 2 
year period and the other for an 8 month period.”254 
 It is instructive to juxtapose Justice Stevens’s response to the fact 
that the grant of certiorari did not encompass the last eighteen or 
nineteen years of the twenty-two year deprivation on use, with his 
action, one year later, in the Court’s most recent property rights case, 
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.255 Brown, as previously 
noted, involved a rule imposed by the Supreme Court of Washington 
requiring that client trust funds that were not of sufficient size or 
duration to generate net interest if placed in separate accounts for 
the individual clients be deposited in an interest on lawyers trust ac-
counts (IOLTA) account for the benefit of legal services programs 
designated by the state court.256 The issues decided below and briefed 
and argued in the U.S. Supreme Court were whether the mandatory 
deposit of client funds into the IOLTA account or the disbursement of 
the interest on those funds to the legal services programs constituted 
compensable takings. 
 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, declared: 
 While it confirms the state’s authority to confiscate private prop-
erty, the text of the Fifth Amendment imposes two conditions on 
                                                                                                                      
 251. See Michael M. Berger, The Shame of Planners, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 
2002, at 6, 7 (noting that the freeze on development contained in TRPA’s 1981, 1984, and 
1987 plans “continues to prohibit the use of virtually all of the lots that were involved in 
the Tahoe-Sierra litigation”). 
 252. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308-09; infra text accompanying notes 376-78. 
 253. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added) (citing the Court’s grant of certio-
rari, 533 U.S. 948 (2001)). 
 254. Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC 
IV), 216 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)). Should the Court have 
considered the totality of what is currently a twenty-two year moratorium? Of course, the 
Court could have remanded with directions that the court of appeals consider that issue. 
 255. 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003). 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 205-12. 
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the exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a “public use” 
and “just compensation” must be paid to the owner. In this case, 
the first condition is unquestionably satisfied. If the State had im-
posed a special tax, or perhaps a system of user fees, to generate 
the funds to finance the legal services supported by the Founda-
tion, there would be no question as to the legitimacy of the use of 
the public’s money.257 
 Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that these “ruminations . . . 
come as a surprise, inasmuch as they address a nonjurisdictional 
constitutional issue raised by neither the parties nor their amici.”258 
TSPC’s attorney subsequently made the same point, albeit more col-
orfully:  
“Ponder this: the same Justice Stevens who couldn’t think of a way 
to deal with the rolling moratoria issue in Tahoe-Sierra because 
they hadn’t granted cert on that issue had no trouble dealing with 
the public use issue in Brown when nobody raised the issue at all. 
Curiouser and curiouser.”259 
 From the perspective of a traditional and prudential court, the 
discordance should have been resolved by forbearance in Brown from 
raising nonjurisdictional issues not briefed and argued. The public 
use issue also contributed nothing to shape the outcome. On the 
other hand, were the Court in Tahoe-Sierra to have confronted the 
fact that landowners of modest means have been deprived of all use 
of their property for an aggregate period of twenty-two years and 
running, its view of the nature of interim moratoria, its focus on fair-
ness, and the “seven theories” it enunciated should have been pro-
foundly affected.260 
3.   Highly-Segmented Takings 
 It is so commonplace as to appear unremarkable that eminent 
domain actions often are directed against small slivers of property. 
Typically, the condemnor will acquire only a physical part of the 
owner’s parcel, a practice that has become familiar in part because of 
the acquisition of strips of rural land for highway expansion.261 A 
sometimes more problematic example involves the condemnee that 
                                                                                                                      
 257. Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1417 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 258. Id. at 1422 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 259. Dwight H. Merriam, Panning for Gold in the Trickle of Supreme Court Cases This 
Term: What Can We Learn from the IOLTA and Referendum Cases?, ZONING & PLAN. L. 
REP., June 2003, at 1, 6 (quoting Michael M. Berger).  
 260. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the seven theories. 
 261. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 110, 121 (2002) (observing that “[m]any (perhaps most) condemnations are 
partial takings; that is, the taker acquires only a fraction of the owner’s property and 
leaves the balance in the owner’s hands. This will often occur, for example, when the tak-
ing is for a highway or a utility right-of-way”).   
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intends to acquire a larger set of rights, has been successful in nego-
tiating purchases from the other owners, and utilizes eminent do-
main to acquire the interest of the holdout.262 
 An anti-segmentation rule applies to the partial condemnation of 
parcels. The condemnor must pay severance damages for injury to 
that part of the parcel not condemned.263 The Supreme Court applied 
this principle to a temporary taking, which involved the condemna-
tion of a leasehold interest in a building, in United States v. General 
Motors Corp.264 The condemnation was a short-term leasehold in the 
middle of the condemnee’s long-term leasehold. Just compensation 
was held to include severance damages to that part of the owner’s in-
terest not taken: 
 If the Government need only pay the long-term rental of an 
empty building for a temporary taking from the long-term tenant a 
way will have been found to defeat the Fifth Amendment’s man-
date for just compensation in all condemnations except those in 
which the contemplated public use requires the taking of the fee 
simple title. In any case where the Government may need private 
property, it can devise its condemnation so as to specify a term of a 
day, a month, or a year, with optional contingent renewal for in-
definite periods, and with the certainty that it need pay the owner 
only the long-term rental rate of an unoccupied building for the 
short term period, if the premises are already under lease or, if 
not, then a market rental for whatever minimum term it may 
choose to select, fixed according to the usual modes of arriving at 
rental rates. And this, though the owner may be damaged by the 
ouster ten, a score, or perhaps a hundred times the amount found 
due him as “fair rental value.” Whatever of property the citizen 
has the Government may take. When it takes the property . . . 
terminating altogether his interest, under the established law it 
must pay him for what is taken, not more; and he must stand 
whatever indirect or remote injuries are properly comprehended 
within the meaning of “consequential damage” as that conception 
has been defined in such cases. . . . 
 It is altogether another matter when the Government does not 
take his entire interest, but by the form of its proceeding chops it 
into bits, of which it takes only what it wants, however few or 
minute, and leaves him holding the remainder, which may then be 
altogether useless to him, refusing to pay more than the “market 
rental value” for the use of the chips so cut off. This is neither the 
“taking” nor the “just compensation” the Fifth Amendment con-
                                                                                                                      
 262. See, e.g., County of Sussex v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 796 A.2d 
958 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (holding that county originally planning condemnation 
of a building could settle with the owner and other tenants and condemn the lease of a sin-
gle nonconsenting tenant only), aff’d, 796 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).  
 263. See, e.g., State v. Pahl, 95 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 1959). 
 264. 323 U.S. 373 (1945). 
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templates. The value of such an occupancy is to be ascertained, not 
by treating what is taken as an empty warehouse to be leased for a 
long term, but what would be the market rental value of such a 
building on a lease by the long-term tenant to the temporary occu-
pier.265 
 According to Tahoe-Sierra, General Motors is, perhaps, not on 
point, since different rules apply to regulatory takings than to physi-
cal takings.266 Nonetheless, it is difficult to square the application of 
Tahoe-Sierra’s fairness-based jurisprudence to the denominator of 
the takings fraction while permitting abusive segmentation with re-
spect to the numerator. 
 Another example of deprivation of severance damages is the 
North Carolina Supreme Court’s recent decision in Department of 
Transportation v. Rowe.267 Traditionally, severance damages with re-
spect to the remainder of a parcel partially condemned have been off-
set by the “special benefits” that will rebound to the owner of the par-
cel from the project for which the condemnation is undertaken.268 In 
Rowe, the court extended this offset to “general benefits” received by 
the owner as well.269 This means that severance damages are reduced 
for benefits received from the condemnation project, even though the 
condemnees received no greater general benefits than others in the 
vicinity who suffered no condemnation at all. Also, the landowner 
subjected to the condemnation probably contributed to the cost of the 
project through taxation, thus conferring general benefit upon the 
community. 
E.   Cumulative Actions of Multiple Government Entities 
 Another issue related to fairness is whether the deprivation of 
property should be treated differently for takings purposes if it re-
sults from the actions of one governmental entity or from the actions 
of two or more government entities. In Ciampetti v. United States,270 
the owner’s lands, constituting a collection of 573 lots, were subject to 
federal and state wetland regulations applicable to irregularly-
bounded and not entirely coextensive areas.271 The owner’s state tak-
ings claim was rejected on the grounds that there was federal pre-
                                                                                                                      
 265. Id. at 381-82. 
 266. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 267. 549 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 (2002). 
 268. See 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8A.02 (Julius L. Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed. 
2003) (concluding that “most jurisdictions agree that only ‘special’ benefits may be offset 
against severance damages and neither special benefits nor general benefits may be offset 
against the part taken”). 
 269. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d at 209.  
 270. 18 Cl. Ct. 548 (Cl. Ct. 1989). 
 271. Id. at 550. 
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emption.272 The claims court subsequently rejected the Federal Gov-
ernment’s assertion that the denial of state permits was the basis of 
the federal denial because the Army Corps of Engineers had made an 
independent merit-based determination under federal clean water 
regulations.273 In effect, the claims court rejected an attempt to de-
flect responsibility to a state for what it determined to be a federal 
deprivation. 
 In Lost Tree Village Corp. v. City of Vero Beach,274 an owner of is-
land property brought an inverse condemnation action against a 
town with regulations precluding development unless there was a 
bridge and against a city with regulations precluding construction of 
the bridge.275 The court reversed dismissal of the developer’s suit, 
quoting from Ciampetti276 and concluding: “Both Constitutional pro-
visions emphasize the taking of the property, not the governmental 
unit responsible for the taking.”277 In a sense, both Ciampetti and 
Lost Tree Village mirror the result that occurs when a condemnor 
wishes to acquire a fee simple in land upon which multiple parties 
have ownership interests. The condemnor pays the fair market value 
of the fee simple, and the private claimants must provide or litigate 
how the proceeds are to be allocated.278 
F.   Fairness Requires Consideration of Who Will Bear the Burden 
 As noted earlier, the landowners represented by TSPC had mod-
est lots in existing and largely developed subdivisions in the hills 
above Lake Tahoe.279 While extremely expensive and large homes 
have been built on the lakeshore,280 and resort districts catering to 
numerous tourists are thriving,281 the TSPC owners have been bereft 
                                                                                                                      
 272. Id. at 556. 
 273. Id. at 555-56. 
 274. 838 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). 
 275. Id. at 565.  
 276. Id. at 568 (quoting Ciampetti, 18 Cl. Ct. at 556). 
 277. Id. 
 278. See, e.g., Redevelopment Agency of Fresno v. Penzner, 87 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 
1970). 
 279. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 280. See, e.g., Tom Gorman, The Nation Along Lake Tahoe, Planning for a Throwback 
to the 1980s Officials Say Building of Luxurious Homes on Waterfront Is Out of Control. 
Some Disagree., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at A20 (noting that “luxurious waterfront 
building has gone overboard,” and that at Incline Village, “half-acre lots with 100 feet of 
shoreline frontage are worth $3 million; a five-acre lot with 200 feet of lake frontage is val-
ued upward of $20 million”). 
 281. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Tahoe Aims for Change: From Seedy to Sleek, WALL ST. J., 
May 7, 2003, at B1 (reporting that the “bustling south shore of Lake Tahoe, unlike the 
more open and upscale north-shore area, is undergoing an estimated $500 million make-
over to replace most of its 1950s and 1960s-era budget motels with sleeker, more environ-
ment[ally-]friendly buildings”). 
2004]                          PLANNING MORATORIA 469 
 
of all use and enjoyment of their land since 1981.282 These considera-
tions led the petitioners in Tahoe-Sierra to pose the following certio-
rari question, which the Court did not accept: 
 3. Can a land use regulatory agency purport to “protect the envi-
ronment” at a major regional location (here, Lake Tahoe) by com-
pelling a selected group of individual landowners to forego all use 
of their individual homesites, and thereby compel a de facto dona-
tion of their land for public use without compensation?283 
 While Justice Stevens’s majority opinion did not comment on this 
issue as such, it contained an explanation that touched upon it: 
[W]ith a temporary ban on development there is a lesser risk that 
individual landowners will be “singled out” to bear a special bur-
den that should be shared by the public as a whole. At least with a 
moratorium there is a clear “reciprocity of advantage,” because it 
protects the interests of all affected landowners against immediate 
construction that might be inconsistent with the provisions of the 
plan that is ultimately adopted. “While each of us is burdened 
somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from 
the restrictions that are placed on others.” In fact, there is reason 
to believe property values often will continue to increase despite a 
moratorium. Such an increase makes sense in this context because 
property values throughout the Basin can be expected to reflect 
the added assurance that Lake Tahoe will remain in its pristine 
state.284 
 The notion of “reciprocity of advantage,” which the Court borrows 
from Justice Holmes,285 works so long as the category of landowners 
burdened by the restrictions individually is coextensive with the 
category of landowners and citizens who are benefited. There have 
been times when the Supreme Court has applied this concept accu-
rately286 and times when it has not.287 In Tahoe-Sierra, however, it is 
                                                                                                                      
 282. Kanner, supra note 42.  
 283. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167) 
(emphasis in original). 
 284. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (citations omitted). 
 285. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 286. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (up-
holding the New Orleans Vieux Carre planning regulations and finding “abundantly clear 
that the amended ordinance  . . . is solely an economic regulation aimed at enhancing the 
vital role of the French Quarter’s tourist-oriented charm in the economy of New Orleans). 
 287. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138-39 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist took notice that:  
 Of the over one million buildings and structures in the city of New York, ap-
pellees have singled out 400 for designation as official landmarks. The owner of 
a building might initially be pleased that his property has been chosen by a dis-
tinguished committee of architects, historians, and city planners for such a sin-
gular distinction. But he may well discover . . . that the landmark designation 
imposes upon him a substantial cost, with little or no offsetting benefit except 
for the honor of the designation. 
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clear that the beneficiaries of the planning moratoria are the wealth-
ier shoreline landowners, the merchants who derive significant value 
from tourism, and the people throughout the nation and beyond who 
derive “existence value” from knowing that the Tahoe Basin is pre-
served.288 
IV.   SEVEN THEORIES FOR CHALLENGING UNREASONABLE PLANNING 
MORATORIA 
 For most attorneys, the study of leading Supreme Court cases is 
retrospective in nature but prospective in purpose. The object is to 
assist clients to conform future conduct to the law, to settle ambigui-
ties in their clients’ favor, and to resolve interstitial questions in 
their clients’ interest. In Tahoe-Sierra, the practical and procedural 
constraints that prevented the landowners’ case from being fully ex-
plored in the Supreme Court have been noted. In future controver-
sies involving planning moratoria, such constraints might be 
avoided, and Tahoe-Sierra provides a roadmap in the form of its ar-
ticulated “seven theories” of how landowners might prevail.289 
 Tahoe-Sierra rejected the argument that Lucas, First English, and 
the Court’s other regulatory takings cases compel the use of a per se 
test for planning moratoria.290 It raised up the Armstrong fairness 
principle291 and reiterated the need for utilizing the “fact specific” in-
quiry that Penn Central mandates.292 The Court’s “seven theories” 
dialogue indicates its recognition of the need to curtail abusive 
growth moratoria, to make clear that fairness is the touchstone in 
this effort, and to create a taxonomy for categorizing Penn Central 
challenges to specific development moratoria. 
 Before parsing the individual provisions, it is instructive to view 
Justice Stevens’s seven theories as a whole: 
 Considerations of “fairness and justice” arguably could support 
the conclusion that TRPA’s moratoria were takings of petitioners’ 
property based on any of seven different theories. First, even 
                                                                                                                      
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 288. “Existence value” is the value individuals place upon the continued existence of a 
resource apart from the value of its use. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Consorting with 
Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural Resources and How We Should Value 
Their Loss, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 1680 (1995) (asserting harm “when humans destroy 
natural resources involving damage to a subjective, emotional connection that many people 
feel toward the environment”). But see Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk is Cheap: The Ex-
istence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765, 767 (1999) (asserting that the concept of existence 
value is conceptually flawed). 
 289. 535 U.S. at 333-34.  
 290. Id. at 332 (asserting that “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘ex-
traordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value”). 
 291. Id. (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49). 
 292. Id. 
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though we have not previously done so, we might now announce a 
categorical rule that, in the interest of fairness and justice, com-
pensation is required whenever government temporarily deprives 
an owner of all economically viable use of her property. Second, we 
could craft a narrower rule that would cover all temporary land-
use restrictions except those “normal delays in obtaining building 
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like” 
which were put to one side in our opinion in First English. Third, 
we could adopt a rule like the one suggested by an amicus support-
ing petitioners that would “allow a short fixed period for delibera-
tions to take place without compensation—say maximum one 
year—after which the just compensation requirements” would 
“kick in.” Fourth, with the benefit of hindsight, we might charac-
terize the successive actions of TRPA as a “series of rolling morato-
ria” that were the functional equivalent of a permanent taking. 
Fifth, were it not for the findings of the District Court that TRPA 
acted diligently and in good faith, we might have concluded that 
the agency was stalling in order to avoid promulgating the envi-
ronmental threshold carrying capacities and regional plan man-
dated by the 1980 Compact. Sixth, apart from the District Court’s 
finding that TRPA’s actions represented a proportional response to 
a serious risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might have argued 
that the moratoria did not substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest. Finally, if petitioners had challenged the application of 
the moratoria to their individual parcels, instead of making a fa-
cial challenge, some of them might have prevailed under a Penn 
Central analysis.293 
A.   Equating Temporary Moratoria to Temporary Physical Takings 
[E]ven though we have not previously done so, we might now an-
nounce a categorical rule that, in the interest of fairness and jus-
tice, compensation is required whenever government temporarily 
deprives an owner of all economically viable use of her property.294 
 Conceptually, the establishment of a rule that development mora-
toria are takings per se would put regulatory takings on the same 
footing as physical appropriations of land, which have long been held 
compensable, regardless of whether the appropriations are perma-
nent or temporary.295 After Tahoe-Sierra, this approach appears to be 
dead. 
                                                                                                                      
 293. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333-34 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 294. Id. at 333. 
 295. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (holding tempo-
rary occupancy of an office building by government employees is a compensable taking); 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) (holding permanent flooding 
of private land upstream from a public dam is a compensable taking). 
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 Justice Stevens supported Tahoe-Sierra’s result by citing practical 
concerns about the hindrance of various public functions that such a 
rule would entail. Some are mundane (“normal delays in obtaining 
building permits”),296 and others are perhaps more quixotic (“orders 
temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that vio-
late health codes, fire-damaged buildings”).297 Perhaps most impor-
tant, Stevens added that a strict per se rule would make “routine 
government processes prohibitively expensive.”298 
 These practical reasons being disposed of, the Court rehearsed its 
“Penn Central as polestar”299 approach:  
 More importantly, for reasons set out at some length by Justice 
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
we are persuaded that the better approach to claims that a regula-
tion has effected a temporary taking “requires careful examination 
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” In that opinion, 
Justice O’Connor specifically considered the role that the “tempo-
ral relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisi-
tion” should play in the analysis of a takings claim.300 
 In fact, a strict per se approach to regulatory takings is inconsis-
tent with any theory of land-use regulation beyond nuisance abate-
ment.301 The Court clearly was not ready to entertain such an ap-
proach, and this first theory is a straw man serving as an admon-
ishment that the Court supports planning and that per se arguments 
to the contrary will be rejected. 
 There is, however, one important caveat: Tahoe-Sierra carefully 
limits its application of the “parcel as a whole” rule to temporal seg-
mentation only with respect to fee simple ownership. The majority 
declared that an “interest in real property is defined by the metes 
and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of 
years that describes the temporal aspects of the owner’s interest.”302 
Concomitantly, “a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by 
a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will 
recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”303 A lesser term 
than a fee simple might be rendered valueless because it might ter-
minate before the planning moratorium is set to expire. This might 
                                                                                                                      
 296. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334-35 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)). 
 297. Id. at 335. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 300. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
632, 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis omitted). 
 301. Compare id., with EPSTEIN, supra note 160 (advocating a strict per se approach to 
regulatory takings). 
 302. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32. 
 303. Id. at 332. 
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result in a complete deprivation of value and a per se taking under 
Lucas.304 Even if the moratorium would (or might) expire first, the 
owner’s subsequent beneficial use of the parcel might be for only a 
short time. The upshot of this is that the shorter the duration of the 
owner’s estate, the more likely it would be that the moratorium 
would be deemed a Penn Central taking.305 
B.   Moratoria in Excess of Normal Delays 
[W]e could craft a narrower rule that would cover all temporary 
land-use restrictions except those “normal delays in obtaining 
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the 
like” which were put to one side in our opinion in First English.306  
 Given the infeasibility of a strict rule denominating development 
moratoria as takings,307 a categorical rule tempered by notions of rea-
sonableness might protect private property rights while at the same 
time allowing for permissible governmental review of land develop-
ment. “Normal delays,” the term used in First English to describe a 
possible exception to the Court’s holding that compensation is the 
appropriate remedy for a temporary taking, seems well suited to this 
task.308 
 The Court concedes that a “narrower rule that excluded the nor-
mal delays associated with processing permits . . . would certainly 
have a less severe impact on prevailing practices.”309 Contravening 
this, it adds that a narrower rule “would still impose serious finan-
cial constraints on the planning process,” which is important, since 
moratoria like those in Tahoe-Sierra are widely used and such in-
terim growth controls “are an essential tool of successful develop-
ment.”310 
 Given the Court’s recent aversion to bright-line rules regarding 
regulatory takings evidenced in Palazzolo311 and Tahoe-Sierra, it is 
                                                                                                                      
 304. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 305. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.  
 306. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)). 
 307. See supra Part IV.A. 
 308. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.  
 We also point out that the allegation of the complaint which we treat as true 
for purposes of our decision was that the ordinance in question denied appel-
lant all use of its property. We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of 
course do not deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the 
case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordi-
nances, variances, and the like which are not before us. 
Id. 
 309. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337. 
 310. Id. at 337-38. 
 311. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606. 
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understandable that the Court would be hesitant to define “normal 
delay.” The problem relates in part to the difficulty in defining delay, 
which seems like a fact-laden concept and therefore inauspicious in 
developing a per se rule. It also has to do with normal, which brings 
up the question of reciprocity of advantage. It is normal that delays 
in planning for residential neighborhoods might be relatively short, 
and that delays in planning for very complex and stressed areas such 
as the Tahoe Basin would extend much longer. There is an obvious 
tension between normal delay as it pertains to the TSPC landowner’s 
modest residential home and normal delay as it pertains to planning 
for the conservation of large, complex, and nationally important en-
vironmental features.312 
 Justice Stevens adds that “even the weak version of petitioners’ 
categorical rule would treat these interim measures as takings re-
gardless of the good faith of the planners, the reasonable expecta-
tions of the landowners, or the actual impact of the moratorium on 
property values.”313 While good faith is expected of government offi-
cials, it is not a substitute for just compensation even under a juris-
prudence based on fairness. 
 In short, “normal delay” is not a viable test for whether a planning 
moratorium constitutes a taking. However, the fact that the duration 
of a moratorium significantly exceeds the duration customary under 
similar circumstances would greatly enhance the possibility that the 
moratorium was compensable under the Tahoe-Sierra fairness test.  
C.   Moratoria in Excess of Specified Periods 
[W]e could adopt a rule like the one suggested by an amicus sup-
porting petitioners that would “allow a short fixed period for delib-
erations to take place without compensation—say maximum one 
year—after which the just compensation requirements” would 
“kick in.”314 
 A rule shifting a burden or a presumption and employing a some-
what arbitrary trigger is a common judicial technique. The Supreme 
Court’s Miranda rule is a prophylactic measure to prevent abuse.315 
The “individualized determination” and “rough proportionality” rules 
                                                                                                                      
 312. For further discussion of reciprocity of advantage in this context, see supra Parts 
III.C.4 and III.F. 
 313. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 338. 
 314. Id. at 333 (citing Brief for the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae 30) (citations 
omitted). “Although amicus describes the 1-year cutoff proposal as the ‘better approach by 
far,’ its primary argument is that Penn Central should be overruled.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 
U.S. at 333 n.28. 
 315. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (limiting admissibility of confes-
sions). 
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of Dolan v. City of Tigard316 similarly try to prevent abuse, since they 
apply to discretionary exactions of property by administrators. Time 
limits on planning moratoria would serve a similar prophylactic 
function. However, Justice Stevens, quoting the majority in Palaz-
zolo, declared that specific time limits on moratoria are “simply ‘too 
blunt an instrument’ for identifying” cases of abuse.317 The fact that 
many states have statutory time limits on planning moratoria was 
duly noted in Tahoe Sierra as well,318 together with the observation 
that “[f]ormulating a general rule of this kind is a suitable task for 
state legislatures.”319 
 After Tahoe-Sierra, the idea of imposition of an arbitrary limit on 
the duration of non-compensable development moratoria seems dead. 
Nonetheless, the Court issued a rather direct warning that length 
does matter: “It may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for 
more than one year should be viewed with special skepticism.”320 Al-
though the Court in Tahoe-Sierra found that the complexity of the 
ecology of the Tahoe Basin resulted in the thirty-two month morato-
rium passing muster,321 future excess duration claims are by no 
means precluded. In Eastern Minerals International, Inc. v. United 
States, the court of federal claims found that a six year delay by the 
Office of Surface Mining in considering a mining permit application 
stated a takings claim based on alleged extraordinary delay.322 A year 
later it awarded plaintiffs some $20 million.323 
 In Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit had earlier declared that unreasonable delay 
would constitute a taking, albeit from the date when the govern-
ment’s conduct became unreasonable.324 As a continued expression of 
this more tempered view, the Federal Circuit reversed Eastern Min-
erals, under the name Wyatt v. United States.325 The court found that 
if there were a delay, it was not “extraordinary.”326 “The length of the 
                                                                                                                      
 316. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (limiting scope of exactions as condition of development 
permits). 
 317. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628). 
 318. Id. at 342 n.37. 
 319. Id. at 342. 
 320. Id. at 341. 
 321. Id. 
 322. 36 Fed. Cl. 541, 550-52 (Fed. Cl. 1996). 
 323. E. Minerals Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 621, 631 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (as-
sessing takings damages). 
 324. 10 F.3d 796, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 325. 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 326. Id. at 1097-98 (noting that courts have “recognized that extraordinary delay must 
be ‘substantial’ and that the Supreme Court has condoned delays up to ‘approximately 
eight years’”). The court cited Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th 
Cir. 1994); Judge Reinhardt’s Ninth Circuit panel opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216 F.3d 764, 781-82 (9th Cir. 
2000), concerning temporary development moratorium of up to forty months; and Dufau v. 
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delay is not necessarily the primary factor to be considered when de-
termining whether there is extraordinary government delay. Because 
delay is inherent in complex regulatory permitting schemes, we must 
examine the nature of the permitting process as well as the reasons 
for any delay.”327 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s recent decision 
in Cooley v. United States328 noted that, pursuant to Tahoe-Sierra, 
compensation based on an extraordinary delay claim would have to 
take into account the life of the property remaining after the regula-
tion is lifted.329 
 The case law is quite tolerant of long delays in the issuance of 
permits, and landowners with larger projects are particularly suscep-
tible to government’s assertion that delay arises from the complex 
nature of the facts and policies to be evaluated. This suggests that 
landowners would have a very difficult time raising an extraordinary 
delay argument. However, unwarranted delays typically are associ-
ated with more than ineptitude. According to the Federal Circuit in 
Wyatt, “it is the rare circumstance that we will find a taking based on 
extraordinary delay without a showing of bad faith.”330 In Cooley, the 
Federal Circuit reaffirmed that takings based on extraordinary delay 
in the absence of bad faith are “rare creatures.”331 
 The Court in Cooley added that, “[i]n conducting a Penn Central 
analysis, the trial court may weigh whether the [regulator’s] conduct 
evinces elements of bad faith. A combination of extraordinary delay 
and intimated bad faith, under the third prong of the Penn Central 
analysis, influence the character of the governmental action.”332 Such 
an analysis might be the key to a landowner prevailing in a planning 
moratorium case. As it happens, an example of the genre of extraor-
dinary delay coupled with bad faith might be found in Cooley itself.333 
D.   Rolling Moratoria 
[W]ith the benefit of hindsight, we might characterize the succes-
sive actions of TRPA as a “series of rolling moratoria” that were 
the functional equivalent of a permanent taking.334 
                                                                                                                      
United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156, 163 (Cl. Ct. 1990), concerning permit delay of sixteen 
months. See also Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (ad-
dressing a seven year delay). 
 327. Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098. 
 328. 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 329. Id. at 1306-07.  
 330. Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098. 
 331. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1307. 
 332. Id. 
 333. See infra text accompanying notes 379-92. 
 334. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
333 (2002) (citing Briefs for Petitioners and Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
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 When should a series of related but ostensibly separate moratoria 
on development be regarded as a single moratorium? This issue 
seems implicit in the facts of Tahoe-Sierra and was explicitly raised 
in TSPC’s petition for certiorari.335 The Supreme Court limited certio-
rari so as to exclude sequential moratoria and refused to discuss it on 
the ground that its grant of review did not encompass that issue.336 
Nonetheless, the Court did recite the finding below that “each of the 
two moratoria was a separate taking, one for a 2-year period and the 
other for an 8-month period.”337 
1.   Discerning When Moratoria Are Related 
 It is difficult to understand how each moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra 
was a separate taking. As the Court acknowledged, “‘no regional plan 
was in place as of that date’ [when the first moratorium terminated]. 
TRPA therefore adopted [the second moratorium]”.338 Furthermore, 
as was not indicated in the Court’s opinion, between the expiration of 
the first moratorium and the promulgation of the second was a gap. 
The district court found that during this period the first moratorium 
“was extended—although not by any affirmative action by TRPA, 
and not, contrary to what the defendants have implied, for any set 
period of time.”339 These facts clearly indicate that TRPA did not con-
sider the moratoria to be separate. 
 In analyzing other aspects of post-Tahoe-Sierra development 
moratoria, counsel are apt to focus on the facts as they existed at the 
time the moratoria first were imposed.340 In considering whether se-
quential moratoria constitute one rolling moratorium, however, it is 
                                                                                                                      
 335. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167).  
 2. Can a land use regulatory agency escape its constitutional duty to pay for 
land taken for public use by the expedient of enacting a series of rolling, back-
to-back “temporary” moratoria/prohibitions extending over a period of 20 years, 
and then claiming that each of the individual prohibitions on all use must be 
viewed in isolation from the others and, when so viewed, none was severe 
enough by itself to cross the constitutional taking threshold? 
 In similar fashion, can such an agency escape the constitutional obligation of 
compensation because a court injunction issued in a different case barred issu-
ing permits to other landowners, while the agency’s own regulations precluded 
all use of the Petitioners’ land? 
Id. 
 336. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334 (citing the grant of certiorari, 533 U.S. 948 (2001)).  
 337. Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC 
IV), 216 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)). 
 338. Id. at 311 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency 
(TSPC), 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1235 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 
(9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).   
 339. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
 340. The issue of “good faith,” for instance, would encompass the issue of whether regu-
lators decided on a prolonged or indefinite moratorium at the outset that would be promul-
gated in stages for the purpose of misleading landowners and others. In such an event, 
there would be one moratorium in substance although several moratoria in form. 
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necessary to focus primarily on the facts as they exist at the time 
each moratorium subsequent to the first is promulgated. It is helpful 
to consider three hypothetical situations. In each, an initial morato-
rium is imposed so that planners could consider the implications of 
rapid residential development in an agricultural area. In each as 
well, a subsequent moratorium is imposed as the termination date of 
the original moratorium is approaching. 
•  An earthquake just caused extensive damage in the area, 
and the second moratorium was promulgated so that 
building code standards pertaining to construction of 
structures could be reconsidered. 
•  The subsequent moratorium is imposed because revision 
of the locality’s comprehensive plan to deal with extraor-
dinary growth will take longer than initially contem-
plated. 
•  The subsequent moratorium is imposed to consider the 
need for a new regional waste treatment plant. It pro-
vides that a few low-water intensive uses may be estab-
lished in certain areas. At the same time, the locality an-
nounces that it would buy land in the area at what plau-
sibly is their (low) fair market value, given that the de-
velopment freeze remains in place. 
 In the first hypothetical, involving the earthquake, it is highly 
unlikely that a court would treat the moratoria as anything other 
than separate. The imposition of the second moratorium is respon-
sive to the new condition, something that hardly could have been 
contemplated at the time the original moratorium was imposed. Put 
in traditional land-use planning terms, the situation is analogous to 
a changed condition.341 The landowners should be advised that the 
validity of each moratorium would be judged on its own merits. 
 The second hypothetical involves what was, in retrospect, insuffi-
cient time for revision of the comprehensive plan. While there is no 
evidence of bad faith, it is clear that there is an essential continuity 
between the moratoria. The second moratorium truly is an extension 
of the first and is responsive to the police power concerns that gave 
rise to the first. From the perspective of an aggrieved landowner, the 
two separate moratoria correspond to one continuing deprivation of 
economic enjoyment. Justice Holmes admonished that “the question 
                                                                                                                      
 341. See, e.g., City of Virgina Beach v. Va. Land Inv. Ass’n No. 1, 389 S.E.2d 312, 314 
(Va. 1990) (striking down “piecemeal downzoning which was not justified by a change in 
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is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained,”342 and the 
Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed that sentiment.343 
 In the second hypothetical, the owner’s loss results from the whole 
of the extended moratorium. Were a court to rule otherwise, the effect 
would be to encourage government regulators to devise initial mora-
torium expiration dates with the thought that needed extensions 
could be promulgated later without adverse consequence to the 
agency. In addition, of course, officials would be tempted to “low ball” 
their estimates to mislead landowners and to enhance the chances 
that subsequent courts would find each separate moratorium reason-
able in duration. 
 The third hypothetical is the most difficult. On one hand, the need 
for a waste treatment plant results from the increased demands for 
water treatment that have been increasing up through the time the 
second moratorium is imposed. However, urbanization often entails 
the need for augmented sewage treatment. In the second hypotheti-
cal, the initial moratorium omitted sufficient time for the review. 
Here, the initial moratorium omitted a necessary component from the 
review. Once again there is a well-shaped property law rule that is 
analogous, the “scope of the project” doctrine.344 It is quite likely that 
the landowner could demonstrate that the government entity fore-
saw, or reasonably should have foreseen, that water treatment plan-
ning was a necessary component of planning for the transformation 
of rural into more populated areas. 
 Thus, in the third hypothetical, the second moratorium would be 
responsive not to conditions that arose at the time of its promulga-
tion, but rather to conditions that existed at the time of the imple-
mentation of the original moratorium. This process also has a sound 
grounding in traditional property law, in the doctrine of “relation 
back” of subsequent actions to the substantive matters to which they 
equitably are attached.345 
 In situations where the second moratorium is responsive to the 
facts as they existed in full at the time the first moratorium was im-
posed, the relation back doctrine seems fully satisfactory. However, it 
might be that the second moratorium plausibly relates to some ex-
tent to facts existing at the time the original moratorium was prom-
                                                                                                                      
 342. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910). 
 343. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1419 (2003) (stating that “[t]his 
conclusion is supported by consistent and unambiguous holdings in our cases” and quoting 
Holmes in Boston Chamber of Commerce, 217 U.S. at 195).  
 344. E.g., Piedmont Triad Reg’l Water Auth. v. Unger, 572 S.E.2d 832, 835 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2002) (noting condemnee not entitled to compensation for value created in scope of 
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 345. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1291 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “relation back 
[as] [t]he doctrine that an act done at a later time is considered to have occurred at an ear-
lier time”). 
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ulgated and to circumstances that reasonably should have been fore-
seen at that time, and partly to more recent events. Where the recent 
events play a minor role in the decision to impose the second morato-
rium, relation back should be imposed. However, where the recent 
events are the principal reason for imposition of the second morato-
rium, it might be more reasonable to ascribe the new moratorium to 
changed conditions. 
 The fact that the second moratorium is imposed as a result of 
events unforeseen at the time of the original moratorium does not 
necessarily mean that the events are unrelated. It might be that the 
first moratorium had both unintended, but foreseeable, consequences 
to which the second moratorium was responsive. In such a case the 
new circumstances relate to the acts of the regulator, and the regula-
tor should not escape responsibility for its acts on the grounds that 
they were unintended. This is another way of making the point that 
the focus should be on what the owner has lost, not what the agency 
has gained. The traditional property doctrine that covers this point 
nicely is “tacking.”346 This point is similar to that underlying Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s attribution of the time period during which 
TRPA’s 1984 Plan was enjoined to the agency.347 While the Tahoe-
Sierra majority declined to consider it,348 the argument certainly re-
mains viable when properly raised. 
 An additional feature of the third hypothetical is that the second 
moratorium does permit low-water intensity uses, perhaps synony-
mous with large lot residential development. Landowners in some 
areas will be eligible to apply for such development and landowners 
in other areas will not. That has implications for structuring litiga-
tion and for the reciprocity of advantage that might be associated 
with the second moratorium. Also, the fact that the locality has an-
nounced a buy-out plan could be viewed alternatively as proof that no 
individual landowner need regard the freeze on development as in-
definitely locking up the value of his property, or as evidence of bad 
faith349 akin to the deliberate creation of condemnation blight de-
signed to further government’s acquisition of land on the cheap.350 
                                                                                                                      
 346. See, e.g., Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1342-43 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (noting that tacking is a doctrine allowing an adverse possessor to include the 
occupancy of his predecessor with his own for purposes of the prescriptive period). 
 347. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
345 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 348. Id. at 313-14 n.8. 
 349. See discussion infra Part IV.E; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
 350. See, e.g., Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1349-50 (Cal. 1972) (requir-
ing compensation for damage resulting from precondemnation announcements when the 
condemnor acts unreasonably by excessively delaying eminent domain action or by other 
oppressive conduct). 
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 The regulator’s underlying intent to acquire the parcel, which it 
continually disapproved development plans for, played an important 
role in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.351 The 
Supreme Court noted the landowner’s submission of evidence that 
the city had earlier contemplated buying the parcel or inducing the 
state to do so, had put money aside for that purpose, but had aban-
doned its plan for financial reasons.352 “The State of California’s pur-
chase of the property during the pendency of the litigation may have 
bolstered the credibility of Del Monte Dunes’ position.”353 In an ear-
lier case, Agins v. City of Tiburon,354 the city had made an aborted at-
tempt to acquire the owner’s spectacular ridgeline land overlooking 
San Francisco through eminent domain before drastically cutting 
back on its permitted housing density.355 The Supreme Court deter-
mined that there had not been a facial taking.356 
2.   Government Responses to Rolling Moratoria Claims 
 Governmental agencies might respond to a rolling moratoria claim 
in several ways. The fact that landowners might insist that sequen-
tial restrictions should be considered along with their challenges to 
the original moratorium might be asserted to be contrary to their ar-
gument that the first moratorium, in and of itself, constitutes a tak-
ing.357 Another argument is that details of the scope and stringency of 
moratoria differ, so that subsequent moratoria “cannot remotely be 
described, in substance, as a simple extension of the earlier morato-
rium.”358 Also, in the absence of full adjudication of subsequent mora-
toria, “no record exists to assess such a challenge on the merits.”359  
 It is important to recognize that one of TSPC’s central premises 
went undisputed: temporary moratoria, standing alone or in combi-
nation, might be pretextual. If so, their substance might indicate 
compensable takings. 
                                                                                                                      
 351. 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
 352. Id. at 699-700. 
 353. Id. at 700. 
 354. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 355. Id. at 258 nn.1 & 3. 
 356. Id. at 262-63. 
 357. Brief for Respondents, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1480565, at *27 n.9. 
 358. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Audubon Society, Natural Resources De-
fense Council, National Wildlife Federation and Sierra Club in Support of Respondents, 
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1597737, at *13-*14 (articulating this 
description of Tahoe-Sierra, given the replacement of “the prior, flat prohibition on devel-
opment” by a new plan providing “a series of flexible alternatives for landowners, including 
the opportunity to develop certain lots; to sell transferable development rights; and to sell 
the fee to the government”) (citations omitted).  
 359. Brief for Respondents, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 
1480565, at *27 n.9. 
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Petitioners are entirely correct that an ostensibly temporary 
measure might, in fact, be so long lasting or indefinite in duration 
that it is a taking under Lucas. The courts are well equipped to 
look behind labels to find the substance of things. Thus, owners 
would certainly be entitled to allege, and courts might well find a 
taking, if a measure labeled as a “moratorium” actually were in-
tended to last indefinitely, or if the government enacted a continu-
ous series of short-term moratoria, effectively creating a single, 
permanent prohibition on development.360 
 As the oxymoron indicates, permanent moratoria are per se tak-
ings.361 But moratoria of lesser durations may be compensable as well 
under the Penn Central analysis featured in Tahoe-Sierra.362 The 
path is difficult, but not insurmountable. Furthermore, even the fact 
that individual ordinances that together comprise sequential morato-
ria expire before judicial review can be obtained does not prevent ju-
dicial condemnation of such conduct.363 
E.   Lack of Good Faith as Indicative of Takings 
[W]ere it not for the findings of the District Court that TRPA acted 
diligently and in good faith, we might have concluded that the 
agency was stalling in order to avoid promulgating the environ-
mental threshold carrying capacities and regional plan mandated 
by the 1980 Compact. Cf. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Mon-
terey, Ltd.364 
 “Good faith” occupies a rather amorphous position in American 
property rights law, implicating both due process and takings analy-
sis.365 The fact that a regulator acts diligently and in good faith does 
not preclude the finding that there has been a taking. As Justice 
Kennedy noted a year prior to his opinion for the Court in City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,366 the Takings Clause 
“operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the [g]overnment to 
do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.”367 It “presupposes 
                                                                                                                      
 360. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense 
Council, National Wildlife Federation and Sierra Club in Support of Respondents, Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1597737, at *13 (emphasis added). 
 361. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.  
 362. Id. at 321-25, 342. 
 363. See Mitchell v. Kemp, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (App. Div. 1991) (noting a recurring 
controversy amenable to review, since the town “has replaced one moratorium law with 
another and has been doing so for nearly five years”). 
 364. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333-34 (citing Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 698 
(1999)). 
 365. See infra Part IV.F. 
 366. 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
 367. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). 
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what the Government intends to do is otherwise constitutional.”368 
Correspondingly, the general rule is that the presence of bad faith 
does not, in itself, invalidate an otherwise reasonable land-use regu-
lation.369 However, bad faith typically manifests itself through ac-
tions that make land-use decisions unreasonable.370 Furthermore, as 
in other areas of property rights law, judges are apt to give good faith 
a larger role in practice than it is accorded in theory.371 
 The Court apparently was persuaded by the truth of the land-
owner’s assertion in Del Monte Dunes that the city simply was not 
going to grant a development permit, even though the landowner 
complied with each of the steadily escalating demands imposed upon 
it.372 Given Tahoe-Sierra’s emphasis on fairness and citation of Del 
Monte Dunes in the good faith context,373 it is important to distin-
guish legitimate governmental development decisions from those 
that treat like-situated individuals differently374 or those that fail to 
substantially advance a legitimate governmental purpose.375 
 In Tahoe-Sierra, a lack of good faith may be evidenced by the fact 
that TRPA’s 1981 plan marked not an interim regulation or a tempo-
rary freeze on development of lands belonging to TSPC members, but 
rather the beginning of a ban on development that has continued 
through this day. The need for a permanent ban seems to have been 
obvious from the outset. Indeed, Justice Stevens quoted the Nevada 
U.S. District Court to this effect: 
                                                                                                                      
 368. Id. 
 369. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687, 684 (Ct. App. 1978) (stat-
ing that the wrongfulness of a state action is not relevant in an inverse condemnation ac-
tion). 
 370. See, e.g., Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3rd Cir. 1998) 
((noting that a landowner had a substantial property interest and that a “substantive due 
process violation is established if ‘the government’s actions were not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest’ or ‘were in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper 
motive.’”) (quoting Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 
1991))). 
 371. The classic study is R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 
WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 337 (1983) (examining a large number of cases and determining that 
the good faith of an adverse possessor is often determinative in deciding ownership). 
 372. See infra text accompanying notes 394-402. 
 373. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333-34. 
 374. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (validating “class of 
one” deprivation of equal protection arising from unusual demand for a very wide munici-
pal utility easement). 
 375. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that “[t]he applica-
tion of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use 
of his land”) (citation omitted); see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 
1042 (9th Cir. 2000) (asserting that state scheme of regulating contracts between gasoline 
refiners and retail dealers did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest). 
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 Those areas in the Basin that have steeper slopes produce more 
runoff; therefore, they are usually considered “high hazard” lands. 
Moreover, certain areas near streams or wetlands known as 
“Stream Environment Zones” (SEZs) are especially vulnerable to 
the impact of development because, in their natural state, they act 
as filters for much of the debris that runoff carries. Because “[t]he 
most obvious response to this problem . . . is to restrict development 
around the lake—especially in SEZ lands, as well as in areas al-
ready naturally prone to runoff,” conservation efforts have focused 
on controlling growth in these high hazard areas.376 
 The evidence is quite convincing that further development on 
high hazard lands such as the plaintiffs’ would lead to significant 
additional damage to the lake. Thus, limiting such development 
unquestionably satisfies the “essential nexus” part of the test. 
There is a direct connection between the potential development of 
plaintiffs’ lands and the harm the lake would suffer as a result 
thereof. Further, there has been no suggestion by the plaintiffs 
that any less severe response would have adequately addressed 
the problems the lake was facing. Thus it is difficult to see how a 
more proportional response could have been adopted.377 
 Of course, had TRPA asserted at the outset that preservation of 
Lake Tahoe required that the landowners permanently be deprived 
of their long-held and reasonable expectations of development, it al-
most certainly would have had to pay compensation. A jurisprudence 
requiring government agencies to pay when they are forthright and 
not to pay when they tell the truth slowly (or, more accurately, per-
mit the truth to dawn slowly among the regulated) is pernicious. It 
also is a glaring example of the kind of conceptual severance that the 
parcel as a whole rule, freshly reasserted in Tahoe-Sierra, purports 
to prevent.378 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled, in Cooley 
v. United States,379 that extraordinary delay, generally coupled with 
bad faith, could be considered by a court applying a Penn Central 
analysis with respect to the third Penn Central factor—the character 
of the governmental action.380 Cooley presents a case study of that in-
terplay. 
 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied Cooley’s application for 
a wetlands fill permit, with the result that his land lost 98.8% of its 
                                                                                                                      
 376. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1232 (D. Nev. 1999) (emphasis added), 
rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).   
 377. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (emphasis added). 
 378. 535 U.S. at 326-27; see also supra Part III.D. 
 379. 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 380. Id. at 1306 (citing Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 799 (Fed. Cir. 
1993)). 
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value.381 The owner asserted a taking and filed an action for compen-
sation in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. In response, the Corps, 
sua sponte, issued what it styled a “provisional permit,” although it 
was labeled “DO NOT BEGIN WORK.”382 Furthermore, in apparent 
violation of a federal regulation precluding the Corps from acting as 
“a proponent [or] opponent of any permit proposal,” it “contacted and 
convinced the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency to waive Cooley’s 
application for a § 401 Water Quality Certification.”383 The Federal 
Circuit observed: 
In forming its litigation strategy, members of the Corps doubted 
whether the Corps could issue legally valid permits after the 1993 
denial. Nevertheless, the Corps ignored its previous findings and 
analysis and issued the 1996 permits based on Mr. Lance Wood’s 
“opinion” that the property consisted of degraded wetlands. 
 Mr. Wood was the Corps’ Assistant Chief Counsel for Regula-
tion. Unlike the Corps’ engineers involved in the original evalua-
tion of whether the land was wetland in 1990, Mr. Wood never vis-
ited the site in forming his opinion. Mr. Wood’s opinion was incon-
sistent with the Corps’ 1993 denial letter, initial evaluation, and 
the “Evaluation and Decision Document.” Mr. Wood’s opinion did 
not change the facts explained in the Corps’ thorough “Evaluation 
and Decision Document” that the site was almost entirely a valu-
able wetland resource and that development on the site would be 
contrary to public interest.384 
 The Federal Circuit recited other troubling facts as well. Cooley’s 
application for a fill permit was denied by the Corps on the grounds 
that he had not submitted sufficient information.385 However, only 
weeks earlier it had received a recommendation from a Tim Fell at 
the local Regulatory Functions Branch recommending that the Corps 
‘“proceed with the decision based on the available information and 
not hold a meeting’ to permit Cooley to submit additional informa-
tion.”386 This was followed by an internal memorandum in which Mr. 
Fell wrote: ‘“I think Cooley has provided enough information so we 
can’t deny based on failure to provide adequate info. . . .’”387 
 In its decision below,388 the U.S. Court of Federal Claims had ap-
plied a Lucas per se test in considering the 98.8% diminution in the 
value of Cooley’s land. The Federal Circuit ordered a remand, noting 
                                                                                                                      
 381. Id. at 1300. 
 382. Id. at 1301. 
 383. Id. at 1303 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(4) (1996)). 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 1300.  
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. 46 Fed. Cl. 538 (Fed. Cl. 2000), aff’d in part, vacated in part by Cooley v. United 
States, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Tahoe-Sierra re-
quired a Penn Central multi-factor analysis unless there were a 
‘“complete elimination of value.’”389 As part of its remand instruction, 
it declared: 
 Here, the record indicates Cooley, after two years of disputing 
the characterization of its property as protected wetlands, applied 
for a wetlands fill permit under the Clean Water Act. The Corps 
requested additional information on alternative sites suitable for 
the proposed mixed development, information supplied by Cooley 
in 1992. Based upon the information provided by Cooley, the Corps 
denied the requested permit in 1993. The Corps continued to delay 
action even after consulting an outside expert in 1995, whose re-
port confirmed Cooley’s 1992 contention that suitable alternative 
sites were unavailable. The Corps ultimately agreed with Cooley in 
1996 that the parcel in question is indeed a degraded wetland. The 
trial court should consider this sequence of events in determining 
whether the Corps’ actions meet the criteria for a finding of ex-
traordinary delay. 
 In the context of making this finding, the trial court may weigh 
this court’s guidance that governmental agencies are best suited to 
develop the technical information necessary to adequately process 
a permit application. Accordingly, those agencies receive appropri-
ate deference in acquiring technical information. However, in the 
instant case the agency admits its requests for additional informa-
tion were not necessary for issuing a permit. The trial court previ-
ously discounted the credibility of the Corps’ argument that the 
permit denial letter requested additional information in an altruis-
tic effort to issue a permit. In conducting a Penn Central analysis, 
the trial court may weigh whether the Corps’ conduct evinces ele-
ments of bad faith. A combination of extraordinary delay and inti-
mated bad faith, under the third prong of the Penn Central analy-
sis, influence the character of the governmental action.390 
 As Cooley suggests, “extraordinary delay” and “bad faith” go hand 
in hand.391 Among other indicia of them are: 
• Requests for information previously supplied to the regu-
lator. 
• Requests for information that the regulator’s own techni-
cal staff deem unnecessary. 
• Failing to provide specific reasons why permit applica-
tions fail to meet applicable standards. 
                                                                                                                      
 389. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330) (citation omit-
ted). 
 390. Id. at 1307 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 391. See id. at 1306-07 (noting the rarity of cases where the court will base a taking on 
extraordinary delay and not couple it with a finding of bad faith).  
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• Failure to provide specific criteria upon which subse-
quent amendments to submitted permit applications will 
be evaluated. 
• Shifts in technical or procedural requirements during the 
time that the permit application is being considered. 
• Escalation of requirements when submitted plan 
amendments satisfy the articulated list of initial applica-
tion defects or suggested application modifications (fail-
ure to take “yes” for an answer). 
• Shifts in substantive agency positions on requirements 
and procedures preliminary to litigation. 
• Intercession with other regulators outside of normal 
practices in processing permit applications. 
• Intercession with third parties (such as the applicant’s 
tenants or lenders) outside of normal permit processing 
practices. 
• Involvement of regulator’s legal staff in the formulation 
of technical standards and policies or their application to 
the landowner. 
• Regulatory denials or prolonged application processing 
where the regulator or another public body has tried to 
purchase the parcel or rights in the parcel, or where gov-
ernment agencies or private groups with whom they have 
a symbiotic relationship (e.g., environmental groups) are 
interested (or induced) to want to acquire rights.392 
 With respect to each of these possible indications of bad faith, full 
documentation is necessary. Landowners should request specific and 
detailed information at every stage of the permit application and re-
view process. 
F.   Moratoria Not Substantially Advancing a Legitimate  
State Interest 
[A]part from the District Court’s finding that TRPA’s actions rep-
resented a proportional response to a serious risk of harm to the 
                                                                                                                      
 392. See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A 
Unified Theory for Partial Takings Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589, 601 (2002) (noting 
that needed studies must be diligently pursued and that moratoria for purposes of conduct-
ing studies unreasonable in scope have been set aside on substantive due process grounds). 
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lake, petitioners might have argued that the moratoria did not 
substantially advance a legitimate state interest.393 
1.   The Importance of Del Monte Dunes 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.394 is the first time that the Court has upheld 
the payment of regulatory takings damages. Justice Kennedy’s opin-
ion implicitly validated the landowner’s conclusion that “[a]fter five 
years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans, . . . the city 
would not permit development of the property under any circum-
stances.”395 The landowner sued in U.S. district court under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, alleging that the “denial of [its] final development proposal 
was a violation of the due process and equal protection provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and an uncompensated, and so unconsti-
tutional, regulatory taking.”396 Del Monte Dunes is important in part 
because its discussion of due process implicates the kind of means-
ends analysis implicit in judicial reviews of fairness—the leitmotif of 
Tahoe-Sierra. 
2.   Moratoria Must Be Related to Legitimate Government Interests 
 In Del Monte Dunes, the district court retained for its own consid-
eration the broad issue of whether the city’s development regulations 
substantially advance legitimate public interests, as opposed to sub-
mitting it to a jury.397 Justice Kennedy approved, and asserted this 
inquiry “is probably best understood as a mixed question of fact and 
law.”398 More generally, the occurrence of a compensable taking “is a 
question of law based on factual underpinnings.”399 The Court re-
buffed the demand400 of the United States, which as amicus curiae,401 
was insistent that the Court explain why the substantial advance-
                                                                                                                      
 393.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
334 (2002). 
 394. 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
 395. Id. at 698 (citation omitted). 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. at 699. 
 398. Id. at 721. 
 399. Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 400. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 704; see also Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Proc-
ess and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1023-24 (2000). 
 401. While the city’s petition for certiorari did not refer to the first prong of Agins, the 
Solicitor General’s amicus brief, in support of the city, proffered the following additional 
question: “Whether a land-use restriction that does not substantially advance a legitimate 
public purpose can be deemed, on that basis alone, to effect a taking of property requiring 
the payment of just compensation.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner, Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (No. 97-1235), 1998 WL 308006, at Part *I. 
2004]                          PLANNING MORATORIA 489 
 
ment test of Agins v. City of Tiburon402 should be associated with the 
Takings Clause as opposed to the Due Process Clause. 
3. Moratoria Must Be Related to Specific Ordinances or 
Regulations 
 The district court in Del Monte Dunes submitted to a jury the is-
sues of whether the city’s repeated rejections of development propos-
als had deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the land 
and whether its rejection of the landowner’s development plans bore 
a reasonable relationship to the city’s articulated justifications. The 
jury awarded the landowner a general verdict for damages.403 Justice 
Kennedy emphasized that the jury had been “instructed, in unmis-
takable terms,” that the city’s purposes were legitimate, and that its 
province “was confined to . . . the city’s particular decision to deny 
Del Monte Dunes’ final development proposal.”404 
[T]o the extent Del Monte Dunes’ challenge was premised on un-
reasonable governmental action, the theory argued and tried to the 
jury was that the city’s denial of the final development permit was 
inconsistent not only with the city’s general ordinances and poli-
cies but even with the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously im-
posed by the city. Del Monte Dunes’ argument, in short, was not 
that the city had followed its zoning ordinances and policies but 
rather that it had not done so. As is often true in § 1983 actions, 
the disputed questions were whether the government had denied a 
constitutional right in acting outside the bounds of its authority, 
and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages. These were ques-
tions for the jury.405 
 Having established that § 1983 claims sound in tort,406 that just 
compensation is a compensatory remedy at law,407 and that “Del 
Monte Dunes was denied not only its property but also just compen-
sation or even an adequate forum for seeking it,”408 the Supreme 
Court upheld the district court’s decision to refer the petitioner’s 
claim to the jury.409 Although a federal trial on a local land-use tak-
ings case is unusual,410 attorneys representing landowners undoubt-
                                                                                                                      
 402. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning law to particular 
property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests . . . .”). 
 403. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 701. 
 404. Id. at 706. 
 405. Id. at 722 (emphasis added). 
 406. Id. at 709. 
 407. Id. at 710-11. 
 408. Id. at 715. 
 409. Id. at 721.  
 410. In Del Monte Dunes, the taking arose prior to the Supreme Court’s determination 
that states must provide a compensation remedy for temporary takings, and here the tak-
ing was temporary since the landowner sold the parcel to the state. Id. at 699-700 (citing 
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edly will want to try to convince federal courts, and state courts 
where permissible, to allow juries to hear issues relating to regulator 
adherence to its own rules in many cases. 
4.   Meeting the Landowner’s Substantial Burden 
 Given Tahoe-Sierra’s strong endorsement of planning, it is 
unlikely that a landowner successfully could challenge the police 
power justifications articulated for development moratoria. If the 
landowner is to prevail, it would be by convincing the finder of fact 
that the government’s actions did not, in fact, comport with its ar-
ticulated purposes. 
 The Supreme Court has not established definitive standards for 
determining when land-use regulations and determinations deprive 
owners of due process of law. Its cases do require that local land-use 
laws have a substantial relation to legitimate state interests and 
may not be arbitrary or capricious in their application to individual 
parcels.411 “This standard reflects the consensus that a local govern-
ment should enjoy wide-ranging latitude in regulating land use for 
the public welfare, and reflects the truism that every land-use regu-
lation, to some extent, chips away at property rights.”412 The various 
standards employed by the courts of appeals recently were analyzed 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
George Washington University v. District of Columbia.413 There, the 
District imposed stringent conditions on student housing when it ap-
proved a special exception to the zoning ordinance for expansion of 
the George Washington University (GW) campus.  The court ex-
plained that “[i]n the land-use context courts have taken (at least) 
two different approaches for determining the existence of a property 
interest for substantive due process purposes.”414 While the Third 
Circuit held that an ownership interest in the land qualifies,415 other 
circuits “have focused on the structure of the land-use regulatory 
process, . . . looking to the degree of discretion to be exercised by 
state officials in granting or withholding the relevant permission.”416 
                                                                                                                      
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304 (1987)). 
 411. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Vill. of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
 412. Kenneth B. Bley & Tina R. Axelrod, The Search for Constitutionally Protected 
“Property” in Land-Use Law, 29 URB. LAW 251, 257 (1997). 
 413. 318 F.3d 203 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 414. Id. at 206-07. 
 415. Id. at 207 (citing DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 
1995)). 
 416. Id. (citing Bituminous Materials v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 
1997); Gardner v. Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. 
v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 
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The D.C. Circuit referred to this as a “‘new property’” inquiry, along 
the lines suggested in Charles Reich’s seminal article.417 
 The D.C. Circuit declined to rule on whether an ownership inter-
est was sufficient because GW met the “new property” standard.418 
After outlining the “considerable variety in the courts’ formulae for 
how severely official discretion must be constrained to establish a 
new property,”419 it found the Eighth Circuit test, which “inquires 
whether the ‘statute or regulation places substantial limits on the 
government’s exercise of its licensing discretion,’”420 more in accord 
with Supreme Court precedent.421 
 The finding of a property interest gives the property owner the 
right to challenge a regulation. At that point, the D.C. Circuit con-
tinued,  
the doctrine of substantive due process constrains only egregious 
government misconduct. We have described the doctrine as pre-
venting only “grave unfairness,” and identified two ways in which 
such unfairness might be shown: “Only [1] a substantial infringe-
ment of state law prompted by personal or group animus, or [2] a 
deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or 
property rights, qualifies for relief under § 1983.”422  
The court found no substantive due process violation, holding that 
the regulation “merely requires the university to house its students 
in a way that is compatible with the preservation of surrounding 
neighborhoods.”423 In short, while GW might have had a good argu-
ment that the denial of its requested special exception was wrong, it 
failed to demonstrate that bad faith led to, or was manifested in, 
egregious misconduct by planning officials. 
 To be sure, however, there are governmental actions resulting in 
property deprivations that are egregious by any standard; the coer-
cive statement found by the court to have been made by the govern-
                                                                                                                      
258 (11th Cir. 1989); RRI Realty Corp. v. Vill. of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 917 (2d Cir. 
1989)). 
 417. Id.; see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (advocat-
ing property-like protections for social entitlements on which recipients justifiably could 
form reliance interests). 
 418. George Washington University, 318 F.3d at 207. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. (quoting Bituminous Materials, 126 F.3d at 1070). 
 421. Id. (referencing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989)). 
Thompson found discretion to be constrained by “substantive predicates,” such as an in-
struction that prison visitation may be denied when “the visitor’s presence . . . would con-
stitute a clear and probable danger.” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463. 
 422. Id. at 209 (quoting Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
 423. Id. at 212. 
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ment acquisition officer to obtain private land for a national park in 
Althaus v. United States is an example.424 
 Substantive due process challenges to arbitrary and capricious 
moratoria brought in state court have enjoyed more success. In 
Anderson v. City of Issaquah,425 a case reminiscent of Del Monte 
Dunes in its implications that the city was toying with the land-
owner, a Washington state appellate court held that “[i]t is unrea-
sonable to expect applicants to pay for repetitive revisions of plans in 
an effort to comply with the unarticulated, unpublished ‘statements’ 
a given community may wish to make.”426 A more recent Washington 
case amplified that “case-by-case policymaking” wrongfully gave un-
restricted discretion to local officials and administrators, a practice 
judicially condemned in Anderson.427 Similarly, courts have struck 
down moratoria with long and unjustified durations,428 as well as in-
definiteness of duration coupled with lack of action to solve problems 
ostensibly requiring the moratorium.429 
G.   Moratoria as Applied 
[I]f petitioners had challenged the application of the moratoria to 
their individual parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some 
of them might have prevailed under a Penn Central analysis.430 
 As a final theory, Justice Stevens suggested that the plaintiffs 
might have attempted “as applied” challenges rather than “facial” 
challenges. Stevens noted that the plaintiffs had “expressly dis-
                                                                                                                      
 424. 7 Cl. Ct. 688 (Cl. Ct. 1985).  
 I am in charge of acquiring lands for the National Park Service. Even though 
we know what your lands are worth, we are going to try and get them for 30 
cents on every dollar that we feel they are worth. Of course, you don’t have to 
accept this 30 cents on the dollar. We will let you wait for a couple of years. If 
you don’t take 30 cents on the dollar right now, you wait for a couple of years. 
After a couple of years if you won’t take 30 cents on the dollar, we are going to 
condemn it. We will condemn your property. You know what that is going to 
mean? That means that you are going to have to hire an expensive lawyer from 
the city and he is going to take one-third of what you get. Plus, you know who is 
going to have to pay the court costs. You are. That is in addition to these ex-
pensive lawyers. 
Id. at 691-92. 
 425. 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
 426. Id. at 755. 
 427. Pinecrest Homeowners Ass’n v. Glen A. Cloninger Assocs., 62 P.3d 938, 943 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003). 
 428. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kemp, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (App. Div. 1991) (addressing a 
variance application delayed for unexplained sequential moratoria extending over five 
years). 
 429. Q.C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (D.R.I. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d 
1340 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 430. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
334 (2002). 
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avowed” a Penn Central analysis and “did not appeal from the Dis-
trict Court’s conclusion that the evidence would not support” recov-
ery under a Penn Central theory.431 Tahoe-Sierra requires that plan-
ning moratoria be evaluated through use of the Penn Central analy-
sis, which “involves ‘a complex of factors including the regulation’s 
economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action.’”432 
1.   Calculating the Economic Impact of the Temporal Dimension 
 The first enumerated Penn Central partial takings test is the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant.433 Use of a takings 
fraction where the duration of the regulation is the numerator and 
the life of the property is the denominator clearly is absurd in the 
case of raw land, which has an indefinite life. Even in the case of 
structures, there must be recognition that economic use to be enjoyed 
in the future has a lower present value than equivalent economic use 
enjoyed now.434 
 A special problem in assessing the economic impact of temporal 
deprivations is that the fair market value of the deferred enjoyment 
takes into account the possibility that the restriction will be abro-
gated. While this market factor legitimately is taken into account by 
purchasers,435 the factor should not be considered by courts. Patently 
ineffectual or unfair regulations are prime candidates for early abro-
gation—a fact that markets take into account. Therefore, lands sub-
ject to undesirable regulatory schemes are worth more than lands 
subject to good ones, where the extent of deprivation is the same 
while the regulation remains in force. The failure of judges to con-
sider this would produce an anomalous understatement of the eco-
nomic impact of bad regulations. 
                                                                                                                      
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. at 315 n.10 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2002)), 321-
22 (indicating rule). 
 433. 438 U.S. at 124. 
 434. For discussion of appropriate measures of regulatory takings damages, see A.A. 
Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 253 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2001), and Wheeler v. City 
of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Cynthia J. Barnes, Comment, 
Just Compensation or Just Damages: The Measure of Damages for Temporary Regulatory 
Takings in Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1243 (1989); Gideon Kan-
ner, Measure of Damages in Nonphysical Inverse Condemnation Cases, in 1989 INSTITUTE 
ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 12 (Carol J. Holgren ed., 1989). 
 435. See, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “A 
speculative market may exist in land that is regulated as well as in land that is not, and 
the precise content of regulations at any given time may not be particularly important to 
those active in the market.” Id. at 1566. 
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2. Planning Moratoria and Reasonable Investment-Backed 
Expectations 
 The nature and ascendancy of reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations has been analyzed earlier,436 so this discussion is limited to 
expectations and planning moratoria. In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Ste-
vens’s opinion conveyed a whiff of the notion that the TSPC land-
owners got the treatment that they knew was coming, and therefore 
should have avoided or deserved: “[P]etitioners ‘had plenty of time to 
build before the restrictions went into effect—and almost everyone in 
the Tahoe Basin knew in the late 1970s that a crackdown on devel-
opment was in the works.’”437 
 In Good v. United States,438 a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit held that the “[r]easonable, invest-
ment-backed expectations are an element of every regulatory takings 
case.”439 Furthermore, Good added, those expectations encompass not 
only the regulations in place at the time an owner acquires an inter-
est, but also the “regulatory climate” at the time of purchase that 
might lead an owner to anticipate more stringent rules in the fu-
ture.440 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,441 the Supreme Court rejected 
the strong form of the “notice rule” theory, under which purchasers 
could not assert takings challenges to preacquisition regulations.442 
However, Justice O’Connor’s swing opinion on this point makes it 
clear that there is some undefined relationship between preexisting 
regulations and purchasers’ expectations—that the timing is “not . . . 
immaterial.”443 More recently, the Court of Federal Claim’s opinion in 
Walcek v. United States444 emphasized that “[w]hile the Penn Central 
analysis anticipates reasonably foreseeable developments, it does not 
require a property owner to be clairvoyant.”445 
 Faced with this body of precedent, the landowner should strive to 
document both her intent to develop and also the unforeseeability at 
the time of purchase of regulatory constraints that might be imposed 
                                                                                                                      
 436. See supra Part III.B. 
 437. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 n.11 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1241 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d in 
part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).   
 438. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 439. Id. at 1361. This assertion is contested with respect to per se takings. Another 
panel of the Federal Circuit subsequently disagreed and the full court did not grant review 
en banc to settle the conflict. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 440. 189 F.3d at 1361-62. 
 441. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 442. Id. at 626-27; see Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 533 (2002). 
 443. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 444. 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (Fed. Cl. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 445. Id. at 269. 
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upon the parcel later. In the context of planning moratoria, such an 
argument would focus upon the extent to which the duration or scope 
of the moratorium exceeds that which reasonably could have been 
contemplated. 
3.   The Character of Planning Moratoria 
 When the Supreme Court promulgated the “character of the gov-
ernmental action” test in Penn Central, it established a clear refer-
ent—the distinction between physical invasions and the imposition of 
police power regulations.446 Only four years later, however, the viabil-
ity of the distinction was vitiated when the Court held that all per-
manent physical invasions are per se takings.447 As a result, charac-
ter became a distinction in search of content. More recently, as Jus-
tice Holmes might have put it, the test has entered upon a “new ca-
reer.”448 
 In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,449 the Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of applying a law, intended to rescue a coal industry 
retiree pension and medical benefit plan from insolvency, to a com-
pany that last engaged in the employment of miners, triggering the 
application of the statute, many years earlier. The Court’s plurality 
suggested that two factors relevant in considering the character of a 
governmental action were the extent to which the action imposed 
retroactive liability and the extent to which it singles out individuals 
to bear burdens both substantial in amount and unrelated to prom-
ises they made or injuries they caused.450 
 The notion of targeting individuals to bear burdens was further 
developed by Judge Eric Bruggink of the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims in American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States.451 There, 
investors had constructed an extremely expensive, specialized, and 
                                                                                                                      
 446. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). “A ‘taking’ may 
more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a 
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Id. at 
124. 
 447. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). 
 448. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).  
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. 
In the course of centuries, the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the 
rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and 
ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some 
ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with 
the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons 
which have been found for it, and enters on a new career. 
Id. at 5. 
 449. 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
 450. Id. at 532-37. 
 451. 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (Fed. Cl. 2001). 
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efficient fishing vessel. Competitors rallied against it and, apparently 
at their behest, Congress enacted a modification of existing law that 
“retroactively cancelled plaintiff’s existing permits and authorization 
letter and prospectively precluded re-issuance of such permits. It is 
undisputed that the only immediate impact of the rider was to in-
validate the Atlantic Star’s current fishing permits. No other vessels 
were affected by the legislative revocation.”452 After analyzing East-
ern Enterprises, Judge Bruggink concluded that 
the plurality used the familiar Penn Central template to conclude 
that the medical benefits legislation at issue constituted a taking: 
the economic impact, while not confiscatory, was “substantial;” the 
plaintiff had good reason not to anticipate the imposition, thus it 
had a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that the retroac-
tive legislation would not have been adopted; and finally, the tar-
geted nature of the legislation made the character of the govern-
ment action appear to be a taking.453 
 Applying this analysis to the legislative deprivation of economic 
use of the Atlantic Star, Judge Bruggink found that a severe eco-
nomic loss resulted from the regulation; that the reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations of the owners had been thwarted.454 On the 
issue of character of the governmental action, he concluded that 
there had been no alleged problem for which the plaintiff was 
uniquely responsible and “[w]ithout this evidence of responsibility, 
retroactively making the regulatory scheme unavailable to plaintiff 
has no support. This retroactivity favors finding a taking.”455 
 While the liability phase of American Pelagic preceded Tahoe-
Sierra, the damages phase followed it. In his second opinion, Brug-
gink noted that Tahoe-Sierra required a determination of all “rele-
vant circumstances:”456 
 In the present case, the “relevant circumstances” include the fact 
that the character of the government action here strongly tends 
toward a taking. Congress retroactively revoked plaintiff’s permits 
in a targeted fashion. The Atlantic Star was the only vessel which 
fell within the ambit of the 1997, 1998, and 1999 Appropriation 
Acts. It is clear from the record that Congress’ decision was not the 
result of a typical regulatory process. Instead, it was motivated by 
political considerations directly aimed at the Atlantic Star. Con-
gress’ action was far from being a routine delay in agency decision-
making. There was no permit application pending. All permits had 
                                                                                                                      
 452. Id. at 42. 
 453. Id. at 46. 
 454. Id. at 49-50. 
 455. Id. at 51. 
 456. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 575, 591 (Fed. Cl. 2003) 
(awarding damages) (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335). 
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been granted. No decision was held in abeyance pending fact find-
ing. Congress simply decided not to allow the Atlantic Star to fish 
using its previously issued permits. The character of the govern-
ment action thus points to a taking. None of the Court’s concerns 
in Tahoe about promoting deliberative regulatory consideration 
apply.457 
 As previously discussed,458 the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Cooley 
v. United States459 declared that “[i]n conducting a Penn Central 
analysis, the trial court may weigh whether the [regulator’s] conduct 
evinces elements of bad faith. A combination of extraordinary delay 
and intimated bad faith, under the third prong of the Penn Central 
analysis, influence the character of the governmental action.”460 
 Even apart from the question of good faith as such, the combina-
tion of Eastern Enterprises, American Pelagic, and Cooley suggests 
that there is a continuum of situations in which the retroactivity, 
targeting, and the impression of arbitrary or unfair dealing have 
permeated the “character of the governmental action.”461 Landowners 
may wish to employ analyses using these building blocks in many 
types of factual situations. Assume, for instance, that a substantial 
planning moratorium is employed at the behest of a competitor who 
wishes to take over the landowner’s business location, perhaps on the 
allegation of blight and through the intermediary of an urban rede-
velopment authority.462 Alternatively, assume the planning morato-
rium resulted from a process of selling condemnation powers463 or 
squeezing out owners not making the highest possible contribution to 
the municipal tax base.464 In all of these instances, the landowner 
would have a viable argument that the character of the governmen-
tal action lends itself to a finding that there has been a compensable 
taking. 
 The owners of the fishing vessel in American Pelagic “could have 
reasonably anticipated a certain range of future governmental regu-
lation, duly promulgated through the regulatory scheme Congress es-
tablished. The targeted revocation of existing permits, however, and 
the targeted denial of future permits by Congress were not events 
                                                                                                                      
 457. Id. at 591. 
 458. See supra text accompanying notes 379-92. 
 459. 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 460. Id. at 1307. 
 461. Id.  
 462. Cf. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 
1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 463. Cf. Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002). 
 464. Cf. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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any citizen in a constitutional republic could have reasonably ex-
pected.”465 
 This analysis melds aspects of reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations and permissible ways in which government could conduct 
itself. Rules change, and property owners must expect that. However, 
in a constitutional republic, rules do not change in ways that target 
the property of selected individuals to bear burdens unrelated to 
them. Where rules do act in such a fashion, their character augurs 
for the finding that there has been a taking under the Penn Central 
test. Landowners cannot rely upon the absence of planning and, Ta-
hoe-Sierra, on the absence of reasonable planning moratoria. But 
they should be able to rely on the absence of targeted and dispropor-
tionate moratoria. 
4. The Difficulty of Litigating “as Applied” Challenges to Planning 
Moratoria 
 Mounting “as applied” challenges to complex regulations where 
there are hundreds of affected landowners of modest means is a diffi-
cult and financially improbable undertaking. When the Tahoe-Sierra 
litigation commenced in 1981, regulatory takings law was in its in-
fancy. Moreover, in cases alleging state or local deprivations of prop-
erty rights, ripening an action for federal judicial review is very diffi-
cult. The Supreme Court’s Williamson County requirements466 are 
both Byzantine467 and constitute “a special ripeness doctrine applica-
ble only to constitutional property rights claims.”468 Whether the fo-
rum is a federal or state court, planning moratoria are especially dif-
ficult to challenge because moratoria might be extended, perhaps in 
somewhat different form. 
V.   ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR LANDOWNERS 
A.   The Meaning of the Tahoe-Sierra Dicta Is Uncertain  
and Contestable 
 The holding of Tahoe-Sierra is narrow and the dicta are broad. 
Much of the dicta assert principles like “parcel as a whole,” the im-
                                                                                                                      
 465. 49 Fed. Cl. at 49-50. 
 466. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985) (holding that landowner’s claim was not ripe because it had not yet obtained a final 
decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to 
the property). 
 467. See generally, John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the 
“Ripeness Mess”? A Call for Reform so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Court-
house, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 200-01 (1999). 
 468. Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of Con-
stitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992). 
2004]                          PLANNING MORATORIA 499 
 
portance of planning, and the dichotomy between physical and regu-
latory planning jurisprudence. It is by no means clear, however, how 
these abstract ways of looking at takings issues will be clarified when 
exposed to hard cases that test them. Those who see broad precepts 
in Tahoe-Sierra beyond the simple holding that sometimes moratoria 
are justified and sometimes they are not should remember how nar-
rowly the Court read First English. Justice Stevens was able to write 
a majority opinion indirectly citing as controlling authority his own 
dissent in First English itself.469 The author of First English, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, was left to cite its (at the time) heady dicta that 
temporary takings “are not different in kind from permanent tak-
ings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.”470 
The present Court’s view in Tahoe-Sierra may prove as evanescent 
as its dicta in First English. 
 The eminent contracts scholar Arthur Corbin long ago wrote: 
 When a stated rule of law works [an] injustice . . . the rule is 
pretty certain either to be denied outright or to be undermined by 
a fiction or a specious distinction. It is said that “hard cases make 
bad law;” but it can be said with at least as much truth that hard 
cases make good law. . . . When [common law judges’] stated rules 
developed hard cases, the rules were modified by the use of fiction, 
by exceptions and distinctions, and even by direct overruling.471 
 When confronted with the hard reality of specific cases, the broad 
and perhaps naive references in Tahoe-Sierra may well require modi-
fication or repudiation.472 It thus is the task of the attorney repre-
senting the landowner to attempt to demonstrate that the Tahoe-
Sierra dicta violate the Court’s own fairness principles in the particu-
lar instance. 
B.   Selecting the Case and Framing the Issues 
 For institutional litigants such as large corporations or advocacy 
groups, cases may be selected carefully, with the purpose of advanc-
ing the litigant’s desired outcome incrementally. Such litigants begin 
with cases with the most appealing facts and seeking the most mod-
est changes in existing law.473 For the private attorney retained by, or 
                                                                                                                      
 469. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V), 
228 F.3d 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from a denial of reh’g en banc). 
 470. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). 
 471. Arthur L. Corbin, Hard Cases Make Good Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78, 78 (1923). 
 472. Examples might include unthinking application of the “parcel as a whole” doctrine 
and indulgence in the assumption that planning moratoria always carry with them recip-
rocity of advantage. 
 473. A famous and highly successful example is that of the NAACP’s “‘litigation strat-
egy’ against state-supported racially segregated schools, which it pursued ‘from the incep-
tion of the campaign in the mid-1920s to its culmination in the early 1950s.’” Steven H. 
500  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:429 
 
volunteering to assist, particular landowners, such cherry picking of 
cases is not an option. 
 In some Supreme Court property rights cases, the nature of the 
facts may well have influenced the Court’s decision significantly. In 
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,474 for instance, 
the city, which previously attempted to buy the petitioner’s land, 
turned down five development plans. The first was well in conformity 
with the city’s regulations, and each subsequent plan satisfied the 
city’s objections to the previous plan.  
 The summary of the facts in Justice Kennedy’s opinion fully in-
corporated Del Monte’s view that it had been toyed with.475 At the 
oral argument, the city’s attorney asserted that the “case is not 
atypical in some respects. The city was faced with a complex decision 
it had to reconcile competing interests, sift through facts, and exer-
cise its discretion and judgment, and it did so.”476 The Court was 
openly incredulous. Justice Scalia said: “The landowner here essen-
tially thinks that it was getting jerked around. . . .  [I]sn’t there some 
point at which . . . you begin to smell a rat, and at that point can’t we 
say . . . this is simply unreasonable.”477 Justice Kennedy asked: Even 
if the property has value, if the city is unreasonable and there is bad 
faith, “isn’t the city still liable in damages for that unreasonable 
treatment of the landowner?”478 
 While the City of Monterey might have convinced the Court that 
its handling of the Del Monte Dunes project was not atypical, neither 
it, nor its amici,479 benefited from the Justices’ inferences. It was 
clear that the city that could not take yes for an answer made a poor 
decision in seeking certiorari.  
                                                                                                                      
Wilson, Brown Over “Other White”: Mexican Americans’ Legal Arguments and Litigation 
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 474. 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
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 476. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Del Monte, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) 
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 477. Id. at *16-17. 
 478. Id. at *19. 
 479. The list includes the National League of Cities, the American Planning Associa-
tion, and many states. 
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 After Tahoe-Sierra, Richard Lazarus, a respected, albeit not disin-
terested, commentator,480 wrote that “[t]he property rights movement 
and its counsel simply overplayed their hand in Tahoe-Sierra.”481 
Undoubtedly property rights groups had grown accustomed to their 
string of victories. Some might have forgotten that Justice Kennedy 
had not joined in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas,482 and 
that Justice O’Connor had signaled her discomfort with per se rules 
in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo.483 However, TSPC’s counsel 
had crafted a certiorari petition responsive to Judge Reinhardt’s 
Ninth Circuit opinion, which apparently decreed that a development 
moratorium never constituted a taking.484 When the Court granted 
certiorari on the inverted question of whether a development morato-
rium always constituted a taking, it awarded the broad middle 
ground to the respondent. Most likely, that led Justices O’Connor 
and Kennedy to join with the liberal wing of the Court. 
 Both Tahoe-Sierra and the case it brought back to undisputed 
preeminence in the takings area, Penn Central, involved preservation 
of iconic American treasures. In both, the Court showed great solici-
tude for conservation plans. Justice Brennan’s Penn Central opinion 
barely mentioned the separate ownership of the air right above 
Grand Central Terminal in the summary of facts and did not refer to 
that owner (and co-petitioner) in the analysis.485 Perhaps the moral is 
clear—establishing favorable legal precedents is doubly difficult in 
cases where the object of regulation is beloved. 
 As noted earlier, the framing of the legal issues by the Court was 
an immeasurable obstacle to the landowners challenging the regula-
tions in Tahoe-Sierra. According to Professor Lazarus, the regulators 
worked to achieve that result: 
Perhaps the most important decision made by government counsel 
at trial was to litigate, rather than stipulate, the factual issues 
pertaining to Penn Central. The resulting trial record prompted a 
series of favorable factual findings by the trial judge that both pre-
cluded any effective appeal of that judge’s Penn Central ruling by 
the landowners and created a very sympathetic factual context for 
TRPA in the Supreme Court. . . . [O]ne factor was present in Ta-
hoe-Sierra that had been missing in prior regulatory takings cases: 
an effective brief in opposition to the petition. . . . The government 
won Tahoe-Sierra because of the narrowness of the legal issue con-
                                                                                                                      
 480. Professor Lazarus had argued for TRPA in Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997), and was on brief for TRPA in Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002). 
 481. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 15. 
 482. See 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 483. 533 U.S. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 484. For discussion of the petition for certiorari and its inversion, see supra Part II. 
 485. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116 (referring to UGP Properties, Inc.). 
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sidered by the Court: whether TRPA’s 32-month moratorium on 
development amounted to a per se Lucas taking in a facial chal-
lenge.486 
 Undoubtedly the government’s victory in Tahoe-Sierra will make 
it more difficult for landowners to litigate unchallenged on broad and 
not well differentiated legal grounds. Given the Supreme Court’s (se-
lective) proclivity not to entertain issues not litigated below, and the 
reluctance of inferior courts to modify existing doctrines, laying the 
groundwork for extending property protection must begin early.  
C.   Building a Record 
 Landowners must anticipate the need for hindsight. It is, after all, 
only in retrospect that a court might discern that a single or aggre-
gated moratorium of compensable duration has been put in place.487 
 This means that counsel must insist on making a proper record at 
every turn. The failure to do this can lead to disaster. In Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council,488 the law of the case, all of the way 
through the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, was that the landowner 
had suffered a total deprivation of economic enjoyment of his land. It 
is not clear that a single Justice believed this to be true, but the 
State had waived the issue in the trial court.489 Likewise, in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,490 counsel for the 
landowner failed to contest the city’s (incorrect) contention that it de-
rived a reasonable return from its operation of Grand Central Ter-
minal, thus leading to erroneous conclusions when the Court applied 
the two economic factors of its new three-factor test.491 Landowners 
cannot assume that regulators expecting to win on overarching theo-
ries will continue to give up practical points, as they had in Lucas. 
 This process can be very daunting, especially since new restric-
tions are implemented even while existing ones are being adjudi-
cated. In Tahoe-Sierra, for instance, the fact that TSPC did not file 
new lawsuits within one or two years after TRPA promulgated its 
1987 Plan was the basis for the district court and Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that TSPC’s suit could not be amended to include them be-
cause the statute of limitations had run. Therefore, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
 486. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 17. 
 487. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 333 (2002) (observing that “with the benefit of hindsight, we might characterize the 
successive actions of TRPA as a ‘series of rolling moratoria’”). 
 488. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 489. See id. at 1009 (stating the finding), 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting 
that the Court was “[r]elying on an unreviewed (and implausible) state trial court finding 
that this restriction left Lucas’ property valueless”). 
 490. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 491. See William W. Wade, Penn Central’s Economic Failings Confounded Takings Ju-
risprudence, 31 URB. LAW. 277, 286-87 (1999). 
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Court deemed petitioners to have waived objection to the 1987 Plan 
and did not consider its freeze on development since 1987 in consid-
ering whether TRPA had imposed a rolling moratorium.492 As counsel 
subsequently retained for the Supreme Court proceedings put it, 
these rulings “required the lower courts to conclude that the land-
owners had a duty to file new suits against TRPA at the very time 
they were fighting for their litigational live [sic] pursuing two Ninth 
Circuit appeals in an effort to reinstate their initial suits.”493 
 The Supreme Court could have heard claims relating to the 1987 
plan under the theory that there was a continuing wrong. Indeed, 
that is precisely what the Court did in United States v. Dickinson.494 
There, thirteen years before Armstrong,495 Justice Frankfurter recog-
nized that “[t]he Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fair-
ness.”496 He built upon this to uphold just compensation claims that 
would have been time-barred if the landowner had to file his action 
at the earliest possible moment: 
The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and not a 
technical rule of procedure enshrining old or new niceties regard-
ing “causes of action”—when they are born, whether they prolifer-
ate, and when they die. We are not now called upon to decide 
whether in a situation like this [alleged taking by deliberate per-
manent flooding] a landowner might be allowed to bring suit as 
soon as inundation threatens. Assuming that such an action would 
be sustained, it is not a good enough reason why he must sue then 
or have, from that moment, the statute of limitations run against 
him. If suit must be brought, lest he jeopardize his rights, as soon 
as his land is invaded, other contingencies would be running 
against him—for instance, the uncertainty of the damage and the 
risk of res judicata against recovering later for damage as yet un-
certain. The source of the entire claim—the overflow due to rises in 
the level of the river—is not a single event; it is continuous. And as 
there is nothing in reason, so there is nothing in legal doctrine, to 
preclude the law from meeting such a process by postponing suit 
until the situation becomes stabilized.497 
 Cases subsequent to Dickinson not only have included the case 
that gave what Tahoe-Sierra now deems the “Armstrong principle,”498 
                                                                                                                      
 492. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 313 n.7 (noting that “this claim was barred by Califor-
nia’s 1-year statute of limitations and Nevada’s 2-year statute of limitations” and that “the 
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 493.  Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 
1692011, at *9 n.11. 
 494. 331 U.S. 745 (1947). 
 495. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 496. Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 748. 
 497. Id. at 748-49 (emphasis added). 
 498. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321. 
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but also the Williamson County499 line of cases emphasizing the need 
to determine the actual scope of land-use restrictions. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist quoted one of those cases, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates 
v. Yolo County,500 in his Tahoe-Sierra dissent: ‘“A court cannot de-
termine whether a regulation has gone “too far” unless it knows how 
far the regulation goes.’”501 While Rehnquist was referring to the ma-
jority’s refusal to consider TRPA’s 1984 plan,502 his point applies 
equally well to the 1987 plan. 
 The Supreme Court might have considered the 1987 plan in spite 
of the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary. The majority might 
have invoked the theory of continuing wrong in Dickinson,503 or sim-
ply ignored its own limitation on its grant of certiorari. As noted ear-
lier, in a property rights case decided a year after Tahoe-Sierra, Jus-
tice Stevens made a larger stretch than is implied here.504 
 As Tahoe-Sierra now leaves the matter, however, landowners are 
in a substantial bind. Where there is one definitive moratorium at is-
sue, they may apply the Supreme Court’s admonition in Suitum v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency505 and Williamson County506 that 
“[a] taking challenge does not ripen ‘until the administrative agency 
has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply 
the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.’”507 Where 
the landowner’s case is buttressed by the argument that sequential 
moratoria show either lack of good faith in the promulgation of the 
first moratorium or an aggregate moratorium of compensable dura-
tion, however, the landowner is in a quandary. 
 A suit filed too early, and therefore bereft of the augmented claims 
arising from the subsequent moratorium, might be rejected by the 
court as not rising to a compensable taking. A suit filed after subse-
quent moratoria are in place might be deemed to have waived the 
initial moratorium, now barred by a statute of limitations. Separate 
lawsuits filed subsequent to the imposition of each moratorium or 
similar act seem to be necessary. Each should recount that the depri-
vations suffered by the landowner that constitute the asserted taking 
                                                                                                                      
 499. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985). 
 500. 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
 501. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting MacDonald, 
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companying notes 255-59. 
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should be considered jointly and severally with previous moratoria. 
Each also should explicitly reserve the right to seek to amend plead-
ings and to file future actions based on subsequent moratoria. Land-
owners should seek to join new lawsuits with existing suits where 
there is a continuity of governmental conduct and objectives. This 
holds true especially where subsequent moratoria might be demon-
strated to be responsive to conditions in existence at the time the 
earlier moratoria were imposed, and not to changed conditions.508 
D.   Tahoe-Sierra Helps Landowners Subject to Unfair Deprivations 
of Property 
 Tahoe-Sierra mandates a jurisprudence of development moratoria 
based on principles of fairness and Penn Central analysis. In the 
process, it affirmed the compensability of partial takings.509 The chal-
lenge for landowners will be to convince courts to apply fairness cri-
teria consistently. 
 Had Tahoe-Sierra adopted a per se approach, landowners would 
have to focus on bright-line rules. However, Tahoe-Sierra adopted an 
ad hoc approach that considers the “complex of factors including the 
regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which 
the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations, and the character of the government action.”510 This orienta-
tion, plus the impossibility of treating some of Tahoe-Sierra’s dicta 
completely literally, gives landowners considerable latitude. Stress-
ing the notion of fairness to raise the connection between parcel as a 
whole, and taking as a whole511 is a key example. 
E.   Measuring Success 
 The tools suggested by Tahoe-Sierra’s seven theories can be em-
ployed to prevail in litigation under the Penn Central ad hoc test in 
federal court, should the Williamson County ripeness criteria be 
met,512 and especially in state court. While it would be difficult for 
landowners to establish the egregious violations of substantive due 
                                                                                                                      
 508. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 509. See supra Part II.D.6. 
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process that federal courts require,513 similar criteria for arbitrary 
and capricious behavior may be employed in actions brought in state 
court under the Federal Constitution or the state’s constitution. 
 While hard-fought victories in appellate courts greatly satisfy 
lawyers, clients are usually better off with negotiated settlements 
that permit viable projects with minimal delays. Since Tahoe-Sierra 
provides landowners viable causes of action, there is an incentive for 
planning officials to compromise. The outcome of negotiations with 
regulators is not a zero-sum game. “Just as American companies 
have become more competitive through increased efficiencies and 
productivity, improvements in how government regulates can greatly 
diminish the damage to private property and the potential for tak-
ings.”514 The most basic goal is to ensure that state statutory or case 
law has provided a foundation that protects owners’ rights when 
moratoria are imposed and interprets it reasonably.515 Planning 
moratoria should specifically identify their objectives.516 They also 
should encourage reasonable interim use of the affected property. In-
terim development ordinances (IDOs) promote this end. As distinct 
from planning moratoria, IDOs permit land-uses in developing areas 
while permanent regulations are developed. They also may permit 
discretionary approvals for projects that are not inconsistent with the 
goals of the long-term plans under development. When coupled with 
a vested rights ordinance, they can provide the landowner with as-
surance that in appropriate situations the undertaking of projects 
during the interim period give rise to vested rights.517 Ensuring that 
planning and other officials actually are working on providing the in-
frastructure and solving the problems upon which the moratoria 
were predicated is also important. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Planning moratoria are a valuable tool for planners and local gov-
ernments. They give government the power to deal with impending 
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growth, which genuinely and reasonably is unexpected, and which, 
therefore, it would have been inefficient to anticipate. On the other 
hand, moratoria may reflect lack of planning or bad planning. In any 
event, the moratorium is inevitably a departure from the ideal of the 
rule of law being the enunciation of clear rules, announced in ad-
vance.518 Since moratoria and subsequent land-use planning occur in 
the context of specific types of projects, sponsored by specific indi-
viduals or groups, opportunities for favoritism and extortion are rife. 
 Our post-Tahoe-Sierra jurisprudence of planning moratoria gives 
less security to landowners than one based on bright doctrinal lines 
intended to protect property rights. However, Tahoe-Sierra is based 
on fairness, and that framework promises landowners the possibility 
of redress to those who have suffered an arbitrary deprivation of de-
velopment rights. 
 More importantly, the availability of effective mechanisms to chal-
lenge arbitrary deprivations gives some pause to officials who might 
be tempted to engage in them. By refusing to uphold the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s endorsement of the per se constitutionality of temporary devel-
opment freezes,519 the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra confirmed that 
there is no bifurcation of individual rights dependent upon whether 
possible infringements of those rights are labeled permanent gov-
ernment policy or temporary government policy.520 
 Tahoe-Sierra should be read as an admonishment that land-use 
regulators act in heavy-handed fashion only at their peril. Affirma-
tive use of the “seven theories” roadmap that Tahoe-Sierra itself es-
tablishes provides a vehicle for vindication of landowner rights 
threatened with unreasonable planning moratoria. 
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